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ABSTRACT 
 
The recent decision issued by the European Commission against Microsoft raises 
legitimate concerns under many respects. First, the way the Commission handled 
the whole proceeding highlighted all the impasse that characterizes antitrust 
authorities when dealing with complex cases from the high-tech world. Secondly, 
the Commission’s decision adopted a mistaken approach to interoperability, 
confusing it with perfect emulation of Microsoft’s copyrighted source code. 
Thirdly, the Commission showed little or no attention to the economics of 
technological leveraging in dealing with the media player market, and ended up 
awkwardly mimicking the rationale upheld by the US District Judge in the 
“browsers war”. We conclude by calling for more sound economic analysis at the 
European Commission, and suggesting what possible solutions could have been 
endorsed, which would significantly improve the level-playing-field in the server 
software and in the media player markets, without hindering incentives to invest 
and consequently stifling innovation.  
 
 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S CASE AGAINST 
MICROSOFT: FOOL MONTI KILLS BILL? 
 
Roberto Pardolesi* and Andrea Renda** 
 
 few years ago, a commentator labeled the Microsoft case as “the 
case of the century”1. Funnily enough, that century is now over, a 
new one has begun, and the Microsoft saga is still here to stay. And 
the case’s latest developments suggest that the whole litigation will remain 
under the spotlight for at least another few years, until the European Court 
of Justice will decide whether to endorse the Commission’s recent decision 
to condemn Microsoft for having abused its dominant position in the 
market for PC client Operating Systems (hereinafter, OS) for the purpose of 
monopolizing adjacent markets and, more importantly, to preserve its 
applications barrier to entry in the tying market.  
The Commission’s decision, published on April 27, 2004, deserves careful 
scrutiny.2 On the one hand, the magnitude of the announced fine, as high 
as €497 million, leads Microsoft to beat yet another record in the history of 
competition policy on this side of the Atlantic. On the other hand, the 
Commission imposed extremely heavy obligations on the Redmond-based 
giant softwarehouse, although the original case brought by the 
Commission was subject to massive reshaping before Monti’s team could 
issue a final decision; and there are sufficient reasons to conclude that the 
final impact of the decision will grandly exceed the aim of restoring a level-
playing field in the affected markets.  
An exemplar punishment, many have noted. An unfair death sentence, 
others remarked. The current debate closely ressembles that which 
occurred in the US at the end of 2001, when the Proposed Final Judgment 
signed by Microsoft, the US DoJ and nine of the eighteen plaintiff states 
was submitted for 60 days to public comments as required by the Tunney 
                                                     
* Director, LE Lab, and Full Professor of Comparative Law, Faculty of Economics, LUISS Guido 
Carli. Email comments at rpardole@luiss.it . 
** Senior Research Fellow, LE Lab, LUISS Guido Carli. Email comments at arenda@luiss.it .  
1 See, i.a., Case of The Century?, Newsweek, 16 November 1998. 
2 The text of the European Commission’s decision is available online at http://europa.eu.int/comm/ 
competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf (last visited on August 19, 2004).  
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Act procedure.3 There is, however, one important difference: the 
Commission’s approach in the proceeding was fiercely criticized by the US 
competition authorities, which implicitly accused EU trustbusters to have 
largely abused their paramount position as consumer welfare watchdogs.4  
In our opinion, the US authorities are fundamentally right in their 
criticisms. The Commission’s approach in the Microsoft case appears 
deeply flawed, and in more than one respect. As a matter of fact, the 
Commission seems to have handled the case with increasing clumsiness, 
exhibiting a glamorous lack of acquaintance with the peculiar economics of 
high-tech industries. And the bugs in the Commission’s approach become 
even more worrying since the Microsoft case, as one of us already noted in 
a recent article, ended up becoming a synechdoche, a part for the whole, a 
settlement of private interests which will inevitably affect the whole future 
of high-tech industries.5 In this respect, we believe that the Commission has 
succeeded in the arduous task of achieving a Pareto-pessimum, devising an 
undesirable solution both for the plaintiffs and the defendant and 
highlighting, once again, that the borders of competition policy and 
industry regulation are still largely nebulous in Brussels.  
The remaining part of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1 briefly 
sketches the main features of the US and EU cases, identifies the key 
differences between the two proceedings and considers whether the 
                                                     
3 The Tunney Act requires the Court to subject any consent decree proposed in any civil 
proceeding brought by the United States under the antitrust laws to a determination of whether 
entry of such decree is in the “public interest.” 15 U.S.C. § 16(b),(e); The 60-day public 
consultation mandated by the Tunney Act procedure for pre-trial settlements elicited an 
impressive number of comments – as many as 32,000 – in the US v. Microsoft case. Consider that 
the first consent decree signed between Microsoft and the DoJ, signed in 1994 and entered by 
Judge Penfield Jackson (U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 159 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C.), rev’d, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. 
Cir. 1995) had received only five comments. Even the proposed final judgment of the famous 
AT&T case, which marked a new epoch in the US telecommunication sector, generated in 1982 
‘only’ six hundred comments. (See U.S. v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 135 (D.D.C. 1982). The 
comments filed during the 60-day consultation are available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/ms-
comment.htm. (last visited on August 19, 2004). For a critical appraisal, see A. Renda, Catch Me if 
You Can! The Microsoft Saga and the Sorrows of Old Antitrust, Erasmus Law and Economics Review, 
1/2004, available at http://www.eler.org/archive/issue1/eler-2004-1-1-renda.pdf (last visited on August 
19, 2004).   
4 See, e.g. John Oates, US DoJ Condemns MS Ruling, The Register, 25 March 2004, available online 
at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/03/25/us_doj_condemns_ms_ruling/. (last visited on August 19, 
2004) According to a growing number of commentators, the EU decision might also lead to future 
conflicts between the US and EU authorities. And this is confirmed by the open letter to 
Commissioner Monti recently drafted by 10 members of the House of Representatives' 
International Relations committee.  
5 See A. Renda, Catch Me if You Can!, supra note 3. 
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different solution provided by competition authorities on the two sides of 
the Atlantic is consistent with the purpose of protecting competition and 
consumer welfare in the relevant markets. However, a thorough 
assessment of the different features of the two cases requires a careful 
analysis of the competitive dynamics of high-tech industries. For this 
reason, in Section 2 we provide a few hints for undertaking such analysis. 
In particular, we describe dynamic competition between system goods 
exhibiting different architectures as well as different degrees of openness, 
under peculiar market effects such as network externalities and learning 
effects. Section 3 analyzes more in detail the Commission’s case, with 
specific emphasis on the issues of refusal to supply in the work group 
server OS market and technological integration in the streaming media 
player market. We find that the Commission adopted a rather awkward 
approach in dealing with both issues. Section 4 concludes, by highlighting 
that endorsing a solution in line with the wording of the consent decree 
recently entered in the US would have contributed to restoring the level-
playing field and a virtuous competitive environment in the software 
industry, without depressing incentives to invest in R&D.  
1 TWO CASES, TWO SOLUTIONS 
At first blush, the European Commission’s case against Microsoft 
substantially differs from the famous case handled by the US Department 
of Justice in 1998, and settled in 2002 with entry of the consent decree by 
District Judge Kollar Kotelly.6 Such difference, anyway, should not be 
overstated. Undoubtedly, the markets subject to scrutiny, the alleged 
abusive conducts challenged in those markets and the remedies identified 
by competition authorities to address those conducts are different. 
Nevertheless, the latest developments in the EU have marked a significant 
deviation from the original case brought by the Commission, leading it to 
ressemble way more closely the allegations and the approach adopted in 
the US. In what follows, we shortly summarize the main similarities and 
differences between the two cases.  
1.1 THE “WEST SIDE STORY” 
The US and EU proceedings share a common starting point: Microsoft 
holds a dominant position in the market for PC client OS, and abused such 
position over the past few years by trying to preserve high barriers to entry 
                                                     
6 For a more detailed description of the US case, see A. Renda, Catch Me if You Can!, supra note 3.  
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in the relevant market.7 The two proceedings, however, deployed in quite 
different directions from this same core statement. In the US, the District 
Court found Microsoft to have successfully leveraged such dominant 
position into the adjacent market for Internet browsing software.8 By doing 
this, Microsoft was attempting to preserve the applications barrier to entry 
that protected its paramount position in the tying market, by ensuring that 
Netscape Navigator and Sun’s Java-based platform did not take over 
Windows’ central role in the PC system. The District Court found that 
Microsoft could profitably exercise such leveraging, on the one hand, by 
technologically integrating Windows with the browser Internet Explorer 
and, on the other, by contractually forcing OEMs not to market or 
otherwise promote competing browsers or other undesired application 
software.9 
For what concerns technological integration, the US proceeding elicited a 
fierce debate, eventually leading to significant amendments both in the 
economic analysis of high-tech markets and in the legal approach to 
technological tying. Initially, District Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson stated 
that Microsoft had illegally tied the sale of its Internet browser to that of its 
operating system Windows, which represented a de facto industry standard 
and, as such, granted Microsoft unmatched ubiquity on end users’ 
desktops.10  
                                                     
7 Incidentally, it is worth recalling that the US and EU competition authorities defined the 
relevant market quite differently. According to the US DoJ, Microsoft is dominant in the supply of 
Operating Systems for Intel-compatible Personal Computers – a market which excludes Apple’s 
MacOS, which was normally considered to be Windows’ fiercest rival. See Section II of Judge 
Jackson’s Findings of Fact, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f3800/msjudge.pdf (last visited 
on August 19, 2004). To the contrary, the European Commission decided to leave the question of 
whether to include non-Intel compatible PC client Operating systems in the relevant market open, 
since “the difference will not be such as to alter the result of the assessment of Microsoft’s market 
power”. See the Commission’s decision, supra note 2, at §326.  
8 The District Court Judge Penfield Jackson’s Findings of fact contain data on the change in 
Explorer and Navigator’s usage share. See Findings of Fact, supra note 7, at §§359-376.  
9 See Findings of Fact, supra note 7, at §170, and the detailed analysis of Microsoft’s code 
commingling provided by the Court of Appeals. See http://ecfp.cadc.uscourts.gov/MS-
Docs/1720/0.pdf, Section B.2, at 36 (last visited on August 19, 2004). On Microsoft’s contractual 
relationships with OEMs, IAPs and ISVs, see the Findings of Fact at §§202-238, 242-310 and 311-
340; see also the decision issued by the Court of Appeals, at Section B.1, B.3 and B.4.   
10 It is worth recalling that Microsoft began commingling the code of Windows 98 and Internet 
Explorer for reasons that might also be related to the alternate fortunes of its judicial saga. In 
Microsoft II, the Redmond-based softwarehouse was condemned for unlawful bundling of 
Internet Explorer with Windows 95, and signed a consent decree in which it committed to 
unbundle the sale of the two products. However, the consent decree specified that Microsoft 
could still choose to design integrated products, a choice which was considered not to infringe the 
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Following these findings, Judge Jackson proposed that Microsoft be split 
into two separate “baby bills”, along the lines of the renown Supreme 
Court’s AT&T decision.11 The Court of Appeals later rejected Jackson’s 
rationale by stating that technological integration should be subject to a 
rule of reason approach, rather than to the per se rule normally applied to 
tying claims.12 A conclusion which was backed by the economic analysis of 
efficiencies spurring from end-user demand for integrated products, such 
as reduced transaction costs and added value from integration. For this 
reason, Microsoft was not ordered to remove the technological integration, 
nor was forced to market a stripped-down version of Windows with no 
browsing functionalities, as had been requested by the nine dissenting 
states in their alternative remedial proposal.13  
On the contrary, as regards Microsoft’s contractual behaviour, the Court of 
Appeals upheld Judge Jackson’s finding that Microsoft had abused its 
paramount position in the market for Intel-compatible PC Operating 
Systems by inducing original equipment manufacturers, independent 
software vendors and other industry players not to market, advertise or 
otherwise promote rival application software, such as the browser 
Netscape Navigator.14 Accordingly, the consent decree signed by Microsoft 
and the DoJ contains a number of remedies addressing this problem. In 
particular, Microsoft was obliged to disclose at reasonable and non-
discriminatory (RAND) conditions the interface information needed by 
application software developers in order to achieve interoperability with 
                                                                                                                                       
wording of the decree. See the Final Judgment entering the 1995 consent decree, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f0000/0047.htm. (last visited on August 19, 2004). 
11 See U.S. v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 135 (D.D.C. 1982) 
12 See Court of Appeals, supra note 9, Section IV.B, at 77. This solution marked a Copernican 
revolution in the antitrust treatment of tying, by endorsing a rule of reason approach as opposed 
to the mainstream per se approach specified in Jefferson Parish. See Christian Ahlborn, David S. 
Evans & A. Jorge Padilla, The Antitrust Economics of Tying: a Farewell to Per Se Illegality?, AEI-
Brookings Working Paper 03-3, February 2003. For a more detailed analysis of the deferential 
approach adopted by US courts towards integrated product design, see infra, note 144. 
13 Again, for a detailed description of the alternative remedial proposal, see A. Renda, Catch me if 
you can!, supra note 3. The text of the alternative proposal is available at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/msdoj/states-remedy.pdf (last visited on August 19, 2004). The dissenting 
States are California, Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Utah, 
Virginia and D.C. The text of the proposed final judgment is available at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/msdoj/ states-fj.pdf (last visited on August 17, 2004).  
14 The Court of Appeals rejected Jackson’s rationale as regards technological tying, and 
disqualified the District Court judge for judicial misconduct and appearance of partiality in 
dealing with the Redmond-based softwarehouse. See Court of Appeals, supra note 9, Section VI, 
at 106.  
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the Windows platform.15 Moreover, Microsoft committed to disclose 
information on the protocols used by Windows to communicate with 
server operating systems, thus allowing for client-to-server interoperability 
(i.e., communication of non-Windows servers with Windows clients).16  
In summary, in the US Microsoft committed to refrain from discriminating 
between contractual counterparties depending on their choice to promote 
competing software products. Microsoft committed to publish the standard 
license conditions for Windows in order to document its compliance with 
the requirement of non-discrimination.17 But Microsoft was not ordered to 
re-design its operating system and remove browsing functionalities, nor 
was obliged to license its Windows interfaces to rivals or to any other 
operator whose purpose was different from that of interoperating with the 
Windows platform.  
The consent decree also provided for a compliance monitoring mechanism, 
which implied the filing of a Status Report to the District Court every six 
months. Since then, four interim Status Reports were filed, highlighting 
that Microsoft had only partially complied with the prescriptions contained 
in the decree.18 In particular, Microsoft is reported to have succeeded in 
disclosing interface information to application software developers, 
therefore allowing for OS-to-applications interoperability at RAND 
conditions. However, the Court expressed some concerns on the way 
Microsoft has so far implemented its licensing of Communication Protocols 
for client-to-server interoperability. Pursuant to the November 6, 2001 
Stipulation, a Microsoft Communication Protocols Programme (MCPP) was 
launched on August 2002. However, the MCPP had led to as few as four 
new licenses when the first Interim Status Report was filed, on July 3, 2003. 
The District Court Judge expressed its concerns on the incomplete 
implementation of Section III.E of the consent decree, which is considered 
to be “the most forward-looking provision in the Court’s remedy” with the 
objective of “unfettering the market and restoring competition”.19  
After the first Interim Status Report, Microsoft has conducted extensive 
negotiations with the Plaintiffs and many other stakeholders, gradually 
                                                     
15 See the Final Decree entered by the District Court, available at www.microsoft-antitrust.gov/ 
pdf/Nov0102MSFinalJudgment.pdf , Section III.D (last visited on August 19, 2004).  
16 Id, at III.E. 
17 Id, at III.B.  
18 The text of the Status Reports are available online at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/ms_index.htm 
(last visited on August 19, 2004).  
19 New York v. Microsoft, 224 F. Supp. 2d 76, 226 (D.D.C. 2002) . 
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improving its standard license terms. Microsoft also published a “reference 
agreement”, which contains technical information on how interfaces are 
implemented by Microsoft.20  But when the second Status Report was filed, 
on October 23, 2003, only four new licensees had joined the MCPP, mostly 
for use in file and print servers.21 As of July, 2004, the number of firms that 
have successfully joined Microsoft’s MCPP has climbed to seventeen.  
There are many reasonable explanations for the limited implementation of 
the MCPP. One possible reason is that client-to-server interoperability lied 
at the core of the EU case. Would-be licensees might thus have adopted a 
“wait-and-see” tactic before undertaking negotiations with Microsoft, since 
a favourable solution in the EU case could have provided them with better 
license conditions. And this is exactly what happened, as we will explain in 
the next sections. 
1.2 THE EU CASE 
Moving from the same finding – Microsoft’s dominant position in the PC 
client OS market – the Commission concluded that Microsoft leveraged 
such position into the market for “work group server” operating systems.22 
The major means used by Microsoft for implementing such leveraging 
strategy was non-disclosure of relevant interface information needed by 
rivals for the purpose of achieving full client-to-server as well as server-to-
server interoperability.23 According to the European Commission, such 
refusal to supply interface information ended up consolidating Microsoft’s 
paramount position in the market for client PC operating systems and (at 
least indirectly) harming consumers.24 Information that Microsoft failed to 
disclose included a full specification of its Windows 2000 directory system, 
Active Directory, Microsoft’s implementation of the Kerberos protocol for 
                                                     
20 The debate over the allegedly limited scope of the reference agreement published by Microsoft 
concerned one of the key issues tackled by the European Commission in the EU Microsoft case. 
The Plaintiffs complained that “[t]hese licenses will not, however, allow the licensee to use the 
technical documentation to implement any of the CPs in a product ... in all events, because the 
license embodied in the Reference Agreement is limited, Plaintiffs do not consider industry 
response to the Reference Agreement to be a useful metric for evaluating the success of the MCPP 
Program.” In other words, the Plaintiffs consider the disclosure of the interface “specifications” to 
represent an insufficient measure, and aim at obtaining disclosure of Microsoft’s 
“implementation” of such interface information. See infra, Section 3.1.4.  
21 See the Second Interim Status Report, supra note 18, at 4.  
22 For a more detailed analysis of the Commission’s market definition exercise in Microsoft, see 
infra, section 3.1.1. 
23 See Commission’s decision, supra note 2, Sections 4.12-4.13, §§185-279. 
24 Id., Section 5.3.1.3.1, §701. 
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authentication over a local network, Microsoft’s object model COM and 
DCOM and a number of other pieces of interface information.25 According 
to the Commission, Microsoft also abused its dominant position by 
granting some of its contractual partners (e.g. Compaq) privileged 
conditions, which other partners (namely, Sun Microsystems) were 
expressly denied.26 
The Commission’s allegations did not end up here. Another branch of the 
case, more similar to the “browser war”, concerned Microsoft’s 
technological integration of Windows with its media player software, 
Windows Media Player (WMP). This allegation was “bundled” with the 
aforementioned one during the proceeding.27 According to the 
Commission, Microsoft illegally attempted to monopolize the media player 
market by forcing OEMs to pre-install Windows Media Player on their 
home computers. For this purpose, Microsoft willingly “commingled” the 
source code of Windows and WMP in order to pre-assemble a full-fledged 
operating system with media streaming functionalities and prevent OEMs 
from removing WMP from their PCs. This strategy allegedly granted WMP 
unmatched ubiquity on end-users’ desktops. Since, according to the 
Commission, end users (especially non-techies) have scant incentives to 
switch to competing products once they find one media player software 
preinstalled on their computers, and since the market is characterized by 
direct and indirect network effects that lead it to tip towards the emergence 
of a single standard media player (WMP), the Commission concluded that 
Microsoft’s conduct seriously jeopardized the persistence of a sufficient 
degree of competition in the relevant market, leading to an imminent 
foreclosure of rivals such as Real Networks and Apple.28  
The Commission also provided a clear definition of the final effect 
produced by Microsoft’s anticompetitive behaviour in the relevant markets. 
                                                     
25 Id., §§208-279. 
26 The agreement between Microsoft and Compaq was aimed at improving interoperability 
between Microsoft Windows server and Compaq’s Tru64 UNIX server OS, a high-end server that 
was not included in the relevant product market. Such an agreement was justified by the need to 
“better serve enterprises that are running a mixed operating system environment that includes 
both Windows 2000 Server and Compaq’s Tru64 UNIX operating system”. See the Commission’s 
decision, supra note 2, at §§231-235. On Microsoft’s alleged refusal to supply information to Sun, 
see id., §§185-207.  
27 EC Commissioner Mario Monti integrated the two proceedings, in order to find out whether 
Microsoft reiteratedly abused its market power by attempting to monopolize more than one 
market, and thus considering Microsoft’s conducts in the workgroup server OS and in the 
streaming media player markets as parts of a single monopolization strategy.  
28 Id., §§835-878.  
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Both conducts were found to be stifling competition and technological 
innovation in the tied markets, indirectly harming consumers.29 For this 
reason, the EC decided to impose quite heavy obligations on the Redmond-
based giant, forcing Microsoft, i.a., to disclose relevant interface 
information at RAND conditions and to market a stripped-down version of 
Windows deprived of its WMP source code. 
Although the Commission’s rationale in challenging Microsoft’s conduct 
might seem sufficiently linear, it is worth recalling that the Commission’s 
case was subject to a “head-to-toe” change over the proceeding’s five-year 
lifetime. As we will explain in further detail in Section 3, the main changes 
occurred in the Commission’s case are the following: 
• Initially, the Commission alleged that Microsoft had leveraged its 
monopoly position in the market for Personal Productivity 
Applications (PPAs) for the purpose of achieving a dominant position 
in the market for entry-level server OS. No reference to PPAs is left in 
the final decision.30 
• The Commission originally defined the relevant market as the market 
for all entry-level server OS, defined as all OS installed on servers 
costing less than USD 100,000. In the final decision, this threshold was 
lowered to USD 25,000. Furthermore, the Commission switched to a 
task-based market definition.31 
• In the first and second Statements of Objection, the Commission 
specified that “full interoperability” should be interpreted as not being 
limited to the specification of Microsoft’s Application Programming 
Interfaces (“APIs”), and included Microsoft’s proprietary 
implementation of such APIs. Later on, the Commission clarified that 
“full interoperability” does not cover Microsoft’s specific 
implementation of given communication protocols.32  
                                                     
29 Id., Section 5.3.1.3.1, §701. 
30 The reference to PPAs is contained both in the Statement of Objections in Sun Microsystems v. 
Microsoft Corporation, Case No. IV/C3/37.345, 1 August 2000 (“First SO”), §250; and in the 
Supplemental Statement of Objections, Filed Against Microsoft Corporation, Case No. Comp/C-
3/37.792, 29 August 2001 (“Second SO”), at §150. 
31 Compare the First SO, at §237; the Second SO, at §104, and the Final Decision, at §§482-489.  
32 See, e.g., the First SO at §347, the Second SO at footnote 230 and the Final decision at §999, 
where the Commission specifies that “[t]he use of the term “specifications” makes clear that 
Microsoft should not be required to disclose its own implementation of these specifications, that 
is to say, its own source code”. 
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All three changes had the effect of substantially reducing the alleged 
impact of Microsoft’s conduct on innovation and competition. 
Nevertheless, the Commission decided to impose Microsoft a huge fine – as 
high as 497 million Euros – and quite heavy undertakings.  
1.3 FACE-OFF 
As we just explained, the US and EU cases, although originated from the  
same finding (Microsoft’s paramount position in the market for client PC 
operating systems), were handled and ended quite differently. In the US, as 
we already mentioned, the case was solved with the entry of a consent 
decree signed by Microsoft, the DoJ and nine of the originally eighteen 
plaintiff states. The Final Order contained only behavioural/contractual 
remedies, aimed at ensuring that Microsoft could not discriminate between 
upstream or downstream market players, and made available to all 
interested parties the interface information needed in order to effectively 
market products interoperable with the Windows platform.  
On the other hand, the EU solution contains much more than mere 
behavioural measures. Microsoft is now forced to re-design its Windows 
operating system in order to eliminate the code-commingling with the 
media player, thus removing such added functionality from Windows’ 
source code.33 Moreover, Microsoft shall open up interface information 
contained in its server OS, which is a different product from the client 
Windows OS that was found to represent an industry de facto standard and 
the real source of market power for the Redmond-based company. Such 
interface information shall be disclosed to rivals in the server market, for 
the purpose of interoperating both with Microsoft’s work group server OS 
and client OS. From this viewpoint, the European Commission’s decision in 
the Microsoft case appears as providing a quasi-structural solution. 
                                                     
33 According to Brad Smith, Microsoft’s General Counsel, “the code-removal approach that the 
commission pursued today is an approach that in our view will help a small number of 
competitors ... at the expense not only of our innovation but at the expense of consumers as well. 
And it’s worth noting that the same competitors that have sought this outcome in Europe also 
sought it in the United States ... And the District Court ... rejected the precise code-removal 
remedy that the Commission has endorsed”. See News Teleconference with U.S.-based Journalists 
Regarding European Commission Decision, available online at www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/ 
default.asp (last visited on August 19, 2004). The disadvantages and costs related to re-designing 
part of Windows’ source code were also prospected and detailed by Bill Gates during the latest 
developments of the US case. See Gates’ testimony before the District Judge, 22 April 2002, 
available at http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/trial/mswitness/2002/billgates/billgates.asp, §§ 185-206 
(last visited: August 17, 2004).   
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In summary, we observe two different cases and two different solutions. 
The most compelling questions now become the following: does the 
difference in the two cases justify the different solution devised? Is it 
correct to address the anticompetitive impact of Microsoft’s alleged abuse 
of its dominant position in the client OS market by imposing disclosure of 
specifications contained in the work group server OS? Does economic 
theory support a solution that imposed the removal of technological 
integration between two different products? We anticipate that the answer 
to all these questions is no.  
2 THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF SYSTEM 
COMPETITION UNDER NETWORK EFFECTS 
A peculiarity of software is that it is never used as a stand-alone product. 
And operating systems make no exception to this rule. Whether it is 
incorporated in a physical support (like a floppy disk, a CD or a DVD) or 
marketed as an entirely intangible good (e.g. downloaded from the 
Internet), all software produces utility for final users only when combined 
with other, complementary goods, just as a steering wheel needs all major 
components of a car in order to become useful for would-be drivers. 
Engineers normally refer to complementary goods in a system as 
“modules”. Similarly, economists crafted for system components the term 
“complementor”.34 In the economic jargon, software must therefore be seen 
as part of a digital system good, composed by many complementors. This 
system good is normally a computing device, such as a personal computer, 
a workgroup server, a handheld device, a mobile phone, a game consolle 
etc.  
Digital system goods exhibit highly peculiar competitive dynamics, which 
economists only recently started to acknowledge and analyze.35 First, 
digital systems are modular: hence, depending on the proprietary features 
of each module, system architectures may vary substantially. Secondly, 
digital systems often compete under network effects, and this implies that 
different architectures might emerge as a result of market effects that call 
for involvement of more than one complementor producer within a single 
                                                     
34 See, i.a., Carl Shapiro and Hal Varian, Information rules.  
35 See, e.g., M.J. Katz and Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 1994, 93. On modularity, see the brilliant description provided by Joseph 
Farrell and Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration and Open Access Policies: Towards a 
Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, Paper CPC 02-035, Competition Policy 
Center, University of California at Berkeley, 2002.  
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system. Finally, competition between digital systems, under certain – rather 
restrictive – conditions, may lead to competitive concerns that are not 
commonplace in traditional markets. Below, we briefly address each of 
these issues.  
2.1 MODULARITY IN DIGITAL SYSTEMS 
As many complex goods, digital system goods are inevitably characterized 
by modularity.36 System goods indeed contain different modules, which 
account for different layers in a system architecture. Each layer performs a 
different function, and the sum of these functions determines the overall 
utility and potential of the system good. Figure 1 sketches the typical 
architecture of a digital system good such as a PC, a handheld device or a 
videogame consolle.  
 
Figure 1: Standard complementors in a digital system good 
Hardware
Middleware
OS
Applications
Content
End-Users
 
 
As shown in the picture, each system is composed by a number of layers, 
normally termed “complementors”. For example, the PC system is 
composed by hardware (which contains different sub-layers, such as the 
                                                     
36 See Farrell and Weiser, supra note 35. See also Richard N. Langlois, Modularity in Technology and 
Organizations, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 49(1): 19-37, 2002; Raghu Garud, 
Arun Kumaraswamy and Richard N. Langlois, (Eds.) Managing in the Modular Age: Architectures, 
Networks and Organizations, Oxford, Blackwell, 2002. 
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microprocessor, memory storage devices, peripherals etc.), an operating 
system, middleware (e.g. a Web browser or a media player), application 
software (such as PPAs) and content.37 In a digital system good, each 
module is linked to adjacent layers through technical specifications known 
as interfaces. Interfaces are needed in order to have different layers “talk” 
to each other. When two complementors belonging to adjacent layers talk 
to each other, computer scientists normally define them as “interoperable”. 
Interoperability is a key issue whenever complementors are not produced 
by the same firm. In this case, we say that the system good exhibits an open 
architecture, and interoperability requires that complementor producers 
share some interface information, i.e. disclose the IPR-protected 
specifications needed to ensure effective communication between different 
complementors.38 A hybrid case occurs whenever some layers of the system 
architecture are open to competition, while others are reserved to a single 
producer. For this reason, we distinguish between closed, semi-open and 
open system architectures:  
• Closed systems correspond to fully integrated business models. All 
complementors are then produced by a single firm, which markets the 
whole system to end users without allowing any other firm to produce 
any of the layers in its system. Closed systems offer the advantage of 
central coordination and higher internal consistency of system 
products, as well as a reduced need to share one’s own intellectual 
property for the purpose of allowing interoperability between different 
complementors 
• Semi-open systems, on the other hand, allow for some degree of 
competition in the production of some complementors. Therefore, they 
correspond to partially disintegrated production chains. This hybrid 
                                                     
37 Operating systems are in charge of governing hardware components and provide a basis for 
both middleware and application software. Middleware is defined as software that exposes APIs 
and therefore can suitably act as platform for application software. Applications, in turn, typically 
run on a “platform” (either an OS or a middleware programme) and support content. Finally, the 
end-user needs an interface in order to effectively make use of the good. In the case of the PC, this 
interface is provided by the operating system and is normally termed a “graphical user interface” 
(GUI). Economists developed the concept of “wetware” for the purpose of accounting for the 
effort and investment that end users have to undertake in order to learn how to effectively use the 
system good.  
38 This can be seen as a peculiar variant of the normal “make or buy” dilemma faced by most 
firms in an industrial context. See, with emphasis on the combination of IPR-protected 
complementors in a complex system good, Somaya, Deepak and Teece, David J., Combining 
Inventions in Multi-invention Products: Organizational Choices, Patents, and Public Policy (December 
2, 2000). Haas School of Business CCC Working Paper No. 99-4. http://ssrn.com/abstract=259889.  
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system architecture has become the most successful driver of industry 
growth over the past two decades. Normally, such architecture emerges 
when one single firm wishes to keep a degree of “command and 
control” on its system, at the same time exploiting the many virtues of 
competition and network effects in all other layers. This reduces the 
overall system price, avoids double marginalization problems and, 
importantly, allows for almost-full exploitation of network 
externalities.39  
• Open systems, at the other extreme, correspond to fully disintegrated 
models of industrial production. In an open system, firms engage in 
competitive races for the production of all complementors. A 
completely open system requires that all firms in the market can 
observe at least the interfaces adopted by each complementor in 
interoperating with the others, as well as the implementation of such 
interfaces by each vendor. As a consequence, open systems are often 
based on open source models in their OS, middleware and applications 
layers. 
2.1.1 Inter-system competition, intra-system competition and 
perfect emulation 
The nature of competition observed in the market differs, depending on the 
specific system architectures that arise in the market. For example, if there 
are only closed systems competing in the market, competition will closely 
ressemble that between producers of non-complex goods, such as, say, T-
shirts or baseball gloves. Since no competition within individual layers will 
be observed, we define this situation as “pure inter-system competition”.  
On the other hand, when at least one system is semi-open, firms will be 
able to enter a competitive race within individual layers of that system. We 
call this situation “intra-system competition”. The degree of intra-system 
competition depends on the relative weight of semi-open systems in the 
industry. The more semi-open systems are widespread, the higher the 
chances, for industry operators, to compete in the production of an 
individual system complementor. In a situation of “pure intra-system 
competition”, all industry players compete within the same system 
architecture. The system, as a result, becomes the market.  
                                                     
39 Examples of this architecture are manifold, and include Sun’s server systems, the Windows 
system architecture for client PCs, PC systems based on Sun’s implementation of the Java 
programming language and many others. In all these system goods, platform vendors chose to 
leave some layers of the system open to competition. 
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Finally, if all systems in the industry are open, each layer of every system 
will be perfectly contextable – i.e. all firms will be able to compete for the 
production of each complementor of all systems in the market. In this case, 
the competitive race will embrace all layers of each and every system, a 
situation which we term “perfect emulation”, since all firms can observe 
and replicate the features of leading complementors.  
Inter-system competition, intra-system competition and perfect emulation 
are modes of competition that can be observed in most knowledge-based 
industries. The most common case occurs when markets are characterized 
by the coexistence of all three types of competition. An interesting dilemma 
would thus be whether competition authorities should steer market 
dynamics by imposing one mode of competition over the others. We tackle 
this issue in the next section.  
2.2 WHICH ARCHITECTURE IS MORE EFFICIENT? 
If a correct economic analysis of the different types of system competition 
suggested that one type is more efficient than all others, then such 
conclusion would serve as guidance for competition authorities as well as 
policymakers. However, as of today, it is very important to reaffirm that 
economists have shown no clear-cut set of reasons for preferring whatever 
type of system architecture over others. As a matter of fact, all system 
architectures exhibit comparative advantages as well as substantial 
drawbacks.  
Indeed, it is normally the peculiarities of the single market environment, 
such as the existence of transaction and hierarchical costs, of learning or 
network effects or the intangible and digital nature of certain products, that 
determine which kind of architecture will eventually come to dominate the 
market. Where transaction costs and the need for central coordination are 
both high, closed or semi-closed systems tend to emerge in the market 
arena. To the contrary, whenever network effects play a paramount role, 
systems tend to open up their architectures in order to fully exploit the 
potential of positive feedback.40 
Many examples of system architectures that were adopted in the home 
computing market can be easily recalled. Apple computers adopted a fully 
                                                     
40 For this same reason, economists have interpreted the gradual opening of the PC system 
architecture as the result of a declining need for central coordination in the PC system. See e.g. 
Randal Picker, Pursuing a Remedy in Microsoft. The Declining Need for Centralized Coordination in a 
Networked World, 158 Journal of Institutional & Theoretical Economics 113 (2002).   
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closed architecture when it marketed its Macintosh personal computer in 
the 1980s.41 And a similar strategy was initially adopted by IBM, which 
later decided to open up its PC system by fostering competition at the OS 
layer.42 Later on, under Microsoft’s realm, the PC system gradually became 
a semi-open architecture. Today, Microsoft Windows is the main platform 
of a complex semi-open system.43.  
A semi-open system was also promoted by Sun Microsystems, with its 
implementation of the Java programming language.44 Finally, the last few 
years witnessed the ascent of systems based on open architectures, such as 
those running open source OS, middleware and applications. Linux, for 
instance, is a successful OS distributed with an open source license, the 
GPL, which ensures that all implementations are left freely accessible to all 
developers wishing to emulate them or write compatible applications.45 
                                                     
41 Apple produced the hardware, operating system and application layer of the system, while 
allowing users to access third-party content on it. Apple manufactured all complementors, 
including hardware devices, the operating system and application software. As a result, there was 
no intra-system competition for the Macintosh, as Apple did not allow any other firm the 
possibility of marketing any of its system’s complementors. 
42 IBM provided a number of industry players with the interface information needed to produce 
operating systems compatible with its hardware. In particular, Microsoft developed the MS/DOS, 
while competing OS producers developed alternative versions of the DOS, such as Novell’s 
DR/DOS. The competitive disadvantage suffered by the DR-DOS as a consequence of Microsoft’s 
choice to bundle the MS-DOS and the Windows 3.1 graphical user interface was under the 
spotlight in the first Microsoft case, ended in 1995 with a consent decree. The DR-DOS was later 
acquired by Caldera, which continued to claim that Microsoft illegally harms competition with its 
tying, vaporware and FUD strategies. See Caldera v. Microsoft, infra note 67. 
43 In Windows-based systems, competition is observed at all hardware layers – including the 
microprocessor (where AMD has gradually entered a market formerly dominated by Intel) – as 
well as at the middleware and application software layers. But only Microsoft can market the 
Operating System Windows, which acts as platform for middleware and application software and 
governs the functioning of all PC hardware devices.  
44 By exposing APIs, Sun’s Java allows middleware products (such as Netscape Navigator) to act 
as platforms for application software, independently of the OS such programs run on. This 
product design strategy – which Sun emphatically marketed to application software developers 
as a “write once, run everywhere” feature – led Sun’s application of Java to become a direct 
competitor to Windows in the race for becoming the leading platform in the PC system. Sun’s 
system architecture was proprietary and semi-open, although Sun allowed third players to 
develop their own versions of the Java Virtual Machine. Such implementation was anyway 
subject to approval and certification by Sun itself. During the US proceeding, Sun Microsystems 
accused Microsoft of having willingly developed a proprietary Java Virtual Machine that did not 
fully meet Sun’s requirements and threatened Java’s “write once, run everywhere” feature. See 
Court of Appeals, supra note 9, Section B.5, 52.  
45 As a result, competitive strategies will focus on differentiation of customer services provided by 
competing firms, as we will explain in the next section. 
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2.3 NETWORK EXTERNALITIES AND LEARNING EFFECTS 
Our discussion of the peculiarities of system competition proves 
particularly important when we deal with the assessment of competitive 
dynamics in high-tech markets. As we already mentioned, depending on 
the kind of system architecture, competition will be observed at some, at 
none or at all layers of a system. But it is the peculiarities of the market 
environment, much more than a top-down decision upheld by a regulator, 
that affect the choice of the preferred system architecture by industry 
players, as well as the type of system architecture that will eventually come 
to dominate the market. In particular, the architectural choice is strongly 
affected by three effects, which have been extensively analyzed by 
economists.  
First, some layers of digital architectures are normally characterized by 
strong direct network externalities. Direct network externalities occur 
whenever a consumer’s willingness to pay for one good increases along 
with the number of individuals that choose to use the good.46 Typically, 
software exhibits some degree of direct network externalities.47 Although 
software, unlike standard network goods such as a telephone, has an 
intrinsic stand-alone value, the value of some software programmes tends 
to increase along with the number of individuals that use them, i.e. their so-
called customer installed base.48  
                                                     
46 For example, users attach a higher value to a telephone if other individuals possess a telephone: 
the higher the number of individuals using the telephone, the higher the possibility of connecting 
to other users. If only one individual possesses a telephone, the telephone is of no use and 
accordingly provides no utility to its user. Direct network externalities typically occur in two-way 
or multilateral networks, such as e2e networks. In such cases, the value of a network will increase 
exponentially as the number of its users increase linearly – a feature that is known as the 
“Metcalfe’s Law”, from the famous founder of 3Com Corporation and designer of the Ethernet 
protocol for computer networks. For a detailed description of direct network externalities, see 
Katz, M.J. C. and Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 American 
Economic Review, 1985, 424; Lemley, M.A. and D. McGowan, Legal Implications of Network 
Economic Effects, 86 California Law Review, 1998, 479; and Roberto Pardolesi and Andrea Renda, 
How Safe is the King’s Throne? Network Externalities on Trial, in Cucinotta, Pardolesi and Van Den 
Bergh (Eds), Post-Chicago Developments in Antitrust Law, Edward Elgar Publishing, February 1, 
2003. 
47 See Pardolesi and Renda, supra note 46. A discussion on network externalities was also carried 
out by the competition authorities on both sides of the Atlantic. See Court of Appeals, supra note 
7, at 11-13; and the Commission’s decision, §§515-522, arguing that the existence of network 
externalities determines the emergence of “strong associative links” between the client PC OS and 
the work group server OS markets, similar to those observed in Tetra Pak II.  
48 On the notion of customer installed base, see Lemley and McGowan, supra note 45. Network 
externalities particularly characterize application software such as Personal Productivity 
Applications or media players, since file sharing between end-users can occur only if such users 
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Secondly, platform layers in a system sometimes exhibit strong indirect 
network externalities, or – as economists sometimes term this phenomenon 
– “positive feedback”.49 Put simply, users attach a higher utility to a given 
platform as the number of applications that run on that platform increases. 
Seemingly, application software developers attach a higher value to 
platforms that have a significant customer installed base. As a result, 
platform vendors deal with more than one category of consumers, and 
have to balance at least two sources of demand in order to successfully 
market their products.50 
Thirdly, some layers of a system are characterized by a user interface – i.e., 
users need to learn how to use the product in order to gain some utility 
from its use. This phenomenon is normally termed “learning effect”. This 
normally happens for all software layers (OS, middleware, applications), 
much less for hardware layers in a system.51 Users invest their time and 
mental resources in order to become familiar with the many specific 
functions of software programmes. This investment is a sunk cost users 
need to face before they can derive any utility from use of the system good. 
Once they have borne this sunk cost, however, they will find it irrational to 
switch to a competing product, at least before the initial sunk investment 
                                                                                                                                       
use compatible tools to produce and consume such pieces of information. To the contrary, other 
application software programmes such as, say, business accounting suites are not usually meant 
for communication, and therefore do not feature significant direct network effects. 
49 See Shapiro and Varian, Information Rules, supra note 34. 
50 Consider the example of Windows, the de facto standard platform for client PC users: Microsoft 
has to attract the demand of both end users and application developers. The higher the number of 
users, the more attractive the platform will become for application developers. The higher the 
number of applications available for Windows, the more attractive the platform will become for 
end users. Authoritative economists have termed such peculiar phenomenon “two-sided 
market”. See David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Two-Sided Markets, Yale Journal of 
Regulation, Summer 2003; David S. Evans, Some Empirical Aspects of Multi-Sided Platform 
Industries, Review of Network Economics, September 2003, Vol.2, Issue 3, at 191; and Jean-Charles 
Rochet and Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, Journal of European Economic 
Association, 2003. In two-sided markets, platforms that achieve a critical mass of both types of 
consumers will tend to become more and more popular. Platforms with a thinner customer base 
will inevitably lag behind in terms of popularity, and will find it hard to gain market share 
overtime. Nevertheless, vendors of successful platforms in two-sided markets will never be 
shielded from competitive pressure: as a better platform starts to spread amongst marginal 
customers, users will start migrating towards the higher-quality platform, leaving the formerly 
dominant vendor with low or no popularity at all. This trend is confirmed by market data from 
the software industry: see David Evans, The Rise and Fall of Leaders in Personal Computer Software, 
in David S. Evans (Ed.), Microsoft, Antitrust and the New Economy, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
2002. 
51 In particular, learning effects arise in the case of Personal Productivity Applications and – to a 
lesser extent, of Operating Systems, which provide users with a GUI or an “environment” in 
which they can find themselves at home. 
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has been recouped. More in detail, users will switch to other platforms only 
in case the added value of such platforms more-than-compensates them for 
two additional costs: the unrecovered sunk investment they faced in 
learning how to use the “old” good, an the sunk investment required for 
the purpose of getting familiar with the “next” good.52  
Direct network effects, indirect network effects and learning effects can 
significantly change the dynamics and welfare effects of system 
competition. In our opinion, the competitive assessment of observed 
conducts should be carried out with a view to the role played by these 
peculiar phenomena in the markets under scrutiny. In particular, 
competitive concerns may be expressed by antitrust authorities whenever a 
particular market is characterized by both strong network and learning 
effects, since the combination of those effects leads markets to tip towards 
the emergence of a single de facto standard, whose owner might end up 
being significantly shielded from competitive pressure over more than one 
product generation.53  
2.3.1 System competition under network effects 
To be sure, when markets are characterized by strong network effects, 
market forces “tip” towards the emergence of a single product, which will 
come to dominate the market for at least one generation of the product. 
Such peculiar dynamics is reflected in the particular type of competition 
that is observed in these markets. Since the market winner will dominate 
the market for one generation, market players will engage in an often 
furious competitive race for the market, instead of competing in the market. 
And, once one of the competitors has gained an edge over its rivals, as 
economists commonly say, “the winner takes all” the market.54  
                                                     
52 For this reason, OS vendors constantly try to develop more friendly graphical user interfaces. 
The simpler the interface, the smaller the sunk investment to be borne in order to switch to their 
product. Such a competitive strategy was under scrutiny in a number of important cases in the 
US, most notably Lotus v. Borland, 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995).  
53 See Pardolesi and Renda, supra note 46. 
54 It is a commonly shared view in today’s economic theory that, since knowledge-based 
industries are characterized by network externalities, competitive concerns may arise as dominant 
firms will remain significantly shielded from competitive pressure, to the detriment of long-run 
consumer welfare. We strongly challenge this “monopoly crystallization” approach, since 
network effects are far from ubiquitous in knowledge-based industries. In several occasions, 
competition authorities have detected network externalities where there was no evidence of such 
effects. Examples of such mistaken approach are manifold. For instance, the FTC defined the 
market for Intel processors as characterized by strong network effects in Intel v. Intergraph. See 
Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (N.D. Ala., 1998), vacated, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 
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Such peculiar dynamics is not particularly worrying from the standpoint of 
economic efficiency. To the contrary, only when industry players compete 
for the market consumers will be able to exploit the maximum potential of 
some information goods, such as software products. Figure 2 below shows 
a welfare analysis of competition for the market with network effects.55 As 
shown in the figure, when firms compete for the market, in the so-called 
pre-standard stage, the market is highly competitive and the price is very 
close to the perfectly competitive level.56 Once the market has tipped and 
the winner has taken all or most of the market for one generation, the 
product marketed by the winning player becomes more and more useful to 
consumers, which now attach a higher willingness to pay for its 
consumption, as a consequence of network externalities. In graphical terms, 
this spurs an outward shift in the demand curve. In the de facto standard 
stage, for sake of simplicity, we assume that only one firm operates in the 
market, the de facto standard owner.  
As shown in Figure 2, if the shift in the demand curve is sufficiently large, 
consumer welfare will be higher under a constant overlapping of one-
generation monopolists than under perfect competition in the market. Area 
B in the figure represents consumer welfare in the de facto standard stage, 
while Area A is the corresponding measure of consumer surplus with no 
tipping, at the pre-standard stage.57  
 
                                                                                                                                       
29199 (Fed. Cir., 1999). We disagree with such a view, since that relevant market – which, in and 
of itself, seemed oddly defined – was characterized neither by network effects, nor by learning 
effects. Microprocessors do not expose any user interface, nor allow for direct communication 
among users. They just allow – to a limited extent – for indirect network externalities, which have 
gradually disappeared once the hardware layer in the PC system architecture was opened up to 
competition. 
55 See Pardolesi and Renda, supra note 46. 
56 As a result, in most cases, prices in the pre-standard stage tend to be close to zero, since 
marginal costs for software products, as widely acknowledged, are normally negligible if 
compared to fixed investments for software development.  
57 Our analysis purposedly neglects a number of features that can affect the pricing and quantity 
decisions of software producers. In particular, the ease with which information goods can be 
rented or shared amongst users and the relevance of piracy in this industry affect the pricing 
decisions made by software vendors and eliminate almost all quantity restrictions related to the 
emergence of a monopoly (have you ever heard of anyone who couldn’t afford to have Windows 
on its hard disk?). We decided not to take these effects into account in the paper, since their 
inclusion would not significantly change the scope and outcome of our analysis.  
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Figure 2 - Competition "for" the market under network effects 
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The welfare analysis shown in the figure also reveals that inter-system 
competition can, in certain cases, prove more welfare-enhancing than intra-
system competition, depending on the intensity of pre-standard 
competition as well as on the magnitude of the shift in the demand curve. 
In order to understand why this occurs, consider that the intensity of pre-
standard competition depends on two variables – the amount of profits that 
will be reaped by the winner and the probability of winning, p. The 
combination of these two elements determines the amount of “expected 
profits” for each of the competing players. Players will invest in R&D to the 
extent that the cost of R&D investments is lower than expected profits. 
 
πE = pπW + (1-p)πL 
 
Where πE is an individual player’s expected profit, πW is the profit reaped 
by the winning player and πL is the profit achieved by losing players – the 
latter being equal to zero in case of pure inter-system competition. When 
winners take all, competing players have the possibility of calculating their 
expected profit, depending on the kind of competition that emerges in the 
market. We distinguish between three different scenarios. 
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Scenario 1. Pure inter-system competition.  
If players compete under pure inter-system competition, the expected 
profit will be reaped only by the winning player. Each player’s  expected 
profit will therefore be calculated as follows: 
πE1 = pπm 
Where πE1 is the expected profit under scenario 1, and πm is the monopoly 
profit. Accordingly, each player’s investments in R&D will depend on the 
likelihood of winning the game. If the outward shift of the demand curve 
in the de facto standard stage is sufficiently large, competing firms will 
have a strong incentive to invest in R&D, since the expected profits are very 
high. Under this scenario, firms competing for the market have a clear 
incentive to cooperate ex ante, forming coalitions whose superior strength 
and customer base enhances the probability of winning, p. For this reason, 
“winner-takes-all” competition led to an increased tendency towards 
cooperation between competitors, which economists usually term “co-
opetition”.58 
Scenario 2. Pure intra-system competition. 
When players compete under pure intra-system competition, there will be 
no “winner takes all” game. All players will have the possibility to market 
all individual complementors, and the market will remain sufficiently 
competitive even in the de facto standard stage.59 Now, let us assume there 
are only two players in the market. The winning player’s profit (πW) will be 
as follows: 
 
πW = mπc + (1-m) πr 
 
where m is the share of the market that will be held by the winning player, 
whereas πc is the level of profits reaped in a more competitive market 
environment, and πr is the royalties reaped from the losing player wishing 
to enter the market. 
Accordingly, the losing player’s total profit (πL) will be: 
 
πL = (1-m)πc – (1-m)πr 
 
                                                     
58 See A.M. Brandenburger and B.J. Nalebuff, Co-opetition, Currency Doubleday, 1996. 
59 We assume away all problems of quantity restrictions in the de facto standard stage. See supra, 
note 56.   
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Where (1-m) is the market share achieved by the losing player. Finally, each 
player knows that she will reap the winning player’s profit with probability 
p and the losing player’s profit with probability (1-p). This means that a 
given player’s expected profit under intra-system competition (πE2) equals: 
 
πE2 = p [mπc + (1-m) πr] + (1-p) [(1-m) πc - (1-m) πr] 
 
In this situation, will the pre-standard competitive race be as fierce as in the 
case of pure inter-system competition? As economists usually answer most 
questions, “it depends”. In our view, it depends on whether the expected 
profit in Scenario 1 is higher than the expected profit under Scenario 2. If 
πE1 > πE2, pre-standard competition will be fiercer under pure inter-system 
competition. To the contrary, if πE1 < πE2, competition will be fiercer under 
pure intra-system competition. Likewise, the industry players’ incentive to 
engage in co-opetition will probably be lower under intra-system 
competition, unless the expected royalties set by the winning player are 
particularly high.  
Inter-system v. intra-system competition 
Inter-system competition might end up being more welfare-enhancing than 
intra-system competition in knowledge-based industries, since it boosts 
incentives for beneficial innovation, fosters co-opetition and enhances the 
variety of system products available on the market. This occurs for a 
number of reasons, including: 
1. Steeper demand curve. Since under pure intra-system competition end 
users find many interchangeable goods on the market, we expect the 
demand curve to become significantly more elastic, as consumers will 
face no significant costs, should they decide to switch to another 
complementor with a better price/quality ratio. Price competition, as a 
consequence, becomes particularly important under pure intra-system 
competition. Players wishing to enter the market only have to purchase 
the license for the de facto standard technology, and market their own 
version of the interoperable complementor. A flatter demand curve 
reduces the expected profits for competing players, and as a 
consequence stifles innovation and R&D investments.  
2. Higher variety. In pure inter-system competition, firms compete with 
different technologies. As a consequence, their investments in R&D are 
to a large extent unrelated, and follow-on innovation is very limited. To 
the contrary, in pure intra-system competition, almost all R&D 
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investments are follow-on, incremental, and innovation proceeds with a 
more path-dependent pattern. Depending on whether incremental 
innovation is more desirable than disruptive innovation, one type of 
competition will end up being more socially desirable than the other.  
3. Stronger co-opetition. In pure intra-system competition, competitors 
know that they will be allowed access to the de facto standard 
technology even if they lose the pre-standard race. For this reason, 
some will choose not to invest in R&D and pay the royalty for entering 
the market at a later stage. More in general, there will be lower 
incentives to form coalitions of competitors for the promotion of 
industry standards, since pre-standard competition is in general less 
risky.  
In summary, in case the shift of the demand curve from the pre-standard to 
the de facto standard stage of the competitive race is substantially large, 
inter-system competition might prove more welfare enhancing than intra-
system competition, since competition at the pre-standard stage will 
certainly be fiercer if players know that the winner will take all the market 
(at least) for one generation. If players know that they will be allowed 
access to the winning platform even if they lose the pre-standard 
competitive race, competition in the pre-standard stage will certainly be 
milder. And the beneficial effects of two-stage competition will not 
materialize.  
Scenario 3 – Perfect emulation 
At the other extreme, competition for the market will not take place if all  
market players adopt an open architecture. Consider the example of free 
software. In this case, since the winning technology will be adopted by all 
competing players at no cost, no pre-standard competition will take place. 
Firms competing under this scenario adopt a fairly different business 
model. In particular, revenues and profits are mostly drawn from 
customized services provided to users of a rather standardized underlying 
technology. Each firm operating in the marketing of a given complementor 
will have free access to the technology, and will be bound to implement 
such technology, tailoring it to the specific need of its customer. The 
technology will advance on a pure incremental basis, but for cases in which 
a path-breaking innovation determines a “forking” in the natural evolution 
of the specific technology.  
In graphical terms, the “perfect emulation scenario” involves no shift in the 
demand curve.  
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As a result, users will profit from very low market prices, since price equals 
marginal cost and fixed costs – at least when open source software is 
included in the system – are lower, as reported in the figure. However, in 
this case users normally have to pay for the IT services provided by 
software vendors in the many aftermarkets of the software value-chain 
(training, IT services, maintenance, technical support, software updates 
etc.).60 
Accordingly, markets where standardization is clearly an asset will not 
select such a competitive environment, whereas markets in which 
consumers strongly need customized solutions and exhibit path-dependent 
consumption patterns (e.g. servers for large business) will tend to privilege 
perfect emulation environments. The latter situation occurs – at least 
partially – in the server industry, as will be clearer in the next sections.  
                                                     
60 This is what normally happens in the server industry, characterized by competing business 
models. On the one hand, proprietary software vendors tend to adopt a “two-sided market 
strategy”, in which platform vendors aim at achieving the de facto standard by building up 
customer base and applications installed base. On the other hand, producers that adopt open 
source software adopt a “Gillette strategy”, by giving away the platform and reaping profits 
through a combination of bundling, relational contracting, software customization and provision 
of a number of IT services. As a result, while proprietary software vendors try to enhance 
standardization in the market, other firms compete by moving from a standardized product (free 
software) to a non-standardized outcome (the customized product), a situation that deprives 
users of the benefits of standardization while enhancing those of ad hoc production of system 
goods. On this issue, see Andrea Giannaccari and Andrea Renda, A Bug’s Life: Reductionism, 
Holism and the Open Source Querelle, LE Lab Working Paper n. IP-04-2004, forthcoming on 
www.law-economics.net.  
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2.3.2 System competition under network and learning effects 
In the previous section, we stated that competition for the market should 
not elicit competitive concerns as far as product generations overlap 
quickly and de facto standard owners are never perfectly shielded from 
competitive pressures. However, once learning effects enter the stage, the 
whole picture might become more worrisome. As we already explained in 
a recent paper, when the market is characterized by both strong network 
externalities and learning effects, de facto standard owners may exploit a 
competitive advantage in the race for the next de facto standard.61 Figure 3 
depicts the welfare analysis of competition for the market when both 
network and learning effects are present. The outward shift of the demand 
curve is coupled by a change in the slope, which becomes steeper.62  
Given that only significant price increases will determine a reduction in the 
quantity of products sold, in graphical terms, the demand curve will 
become more rigid, with mixed effects on consumer welfare. On the one 
hand, consumer surplus increases as consumers attach a higher value to 
products that they already know how to use. On the other hand, however, 
there is a substantial risk that consumers decide not to move to other, even 
better products, because of the magnitude of costs they would have to face 
in case they decided to switch. This market friction might ultimately 
hamper competition on the merits, determining the success of lower-
quality goods instead of awarding market primacy to best-quality 
products. Put differently, learning effects facilitate path-dependent 
behaviour on the side of end users, which are then exposed to a risk of 
remaining “locked-in” the de facto standard product for more than one 
generation.63  
 
                                                     
61 See Pardolesi and Renda, How Safe, supra note 46. 
62 The reason for such change is straightforward. As a matter of fact, the initial investment borne 
by consumers for the purpose of learning how to use the product is a sunk cost. Switching to 
another product would imply that users leave aside the investments faced and invest new 
resources for getting familiar with the new product. 
63 On path-dependency and lock-in, see, i.a., W.B. Arthur., Competing Technologies, Increasing 
Returns, and Lock-in by Historical Events, Economic Journal, 99, 1989, 116.  
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Figure 3 - Competition "for" the market with network and learning effects 
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How does the lock-in problem affect competition in those markets where 
network and learning effects are both present? Economists put forward 
many explanations for the possibility that competition be stifled (and 
consumer welfare decreases) in these situations. Most of these explanations 
involve some form of strategic behavior on the side of the de facto standard 
owner:  
Firstly, the de facto standard owner could try to crystallize its firstmover 
advantage over competitors by contractually forcing producers of 
complementors not to market and/or otherwise promote competing 
products.64 Secondly, the de facto standard owner might try to design its 
product so that competing producers cannot easily emulate its user 
interface, and preventing third-party use of such interface by exercising its 
intellectual property rights. This would yield the effect of increasing the 
switching cost users would face in case they decide to move to a rival 
product. Thirdly, the de facto standard owner could attempt to monopolize 
those adjacent markets where competitors are trying to achieve a 
competitive edge that will allow them to threaten the de facto standard 
owner’s paramount position in the system. A typical tool to achieve such 
leveraging strategy is the bundled sale of the two complementors, or, in 
                                                     
64 A suitable contractual tool for such strategy entails that the de facto standard owner threatens to 
withdraw the license for the de facto industry standard, in case a complementor producer decides 
to promote a rival product in any of the system layers. 
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other cases, the technological integration of the two products.65 Fourthly, 
the de facto standard owner can adopt a number of commercial strategies 
aimed at reducing the likelihood that end users switch to competing 
products.66 Finally, the de facto standard owner might try to influence end 
users’ expectations over which product is going to win the next “winner-
takes-all” game.67  
In all these cases, the de facto standard owner takes action in order to  
achieve a competitive advantage that inhibits the natural overlapping of 
product generations that characterizes virtuous competition in markets 
with network effects. If this occurs, the de facto standard owner might 
indulge in x-inefficiency, to the extent that switching costs are so high that 
the dominant firm can feel completely shielded from competitive pressure. 
As we will see in the next section, the European Commission endorsed this 
view, by alleging that Microsoft adopted all the aforementioned strategies 
over the past few years, for the purpose of strengthening its strategic 
position as the de facto industry standard in the PC system.  
2.4 NETWORKS OF SYSTEM GOODS 
As we already explained, system layers are never used as stand-alone 
products. But in some cases, even system goods are not used as stand-alone 
products, and are interconnected by networks that govern the exchange of 
information between systems. Such networks might be of many different 
kinds, ranging from the mere interaction/communication between system 
goods (e.g., connecting two PCs through a parallel port) up to n-tier 
networks where PCs are governed by a number of larger, more powerful 
                                                     
65 Of course, this only occurs in the case of semi-open architectures, in which system platforms 
struggle for becoming the core complementor in the system. 
66 One of these strategies is versioning, which entails that the product is designed in scalable 
versions, and sold at different prices, in order to match the preferences of different categories of 
users and, consequently, extract more consumer surplus. On versioning, see Hal R. Varian, 
Versioning Information Goods, Working Paper, University of California, Berkeley, CA, 1997, 
available online at http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/~hal/Papers/version.pdf (last visited on August 19, 
2004). 
67 Strategies that have been subject to antitrust scrutiny over the past few years include vaporware 
– i.e., announcing the launch of a new product long before its effective availability on the market 
for the purpose of convincing end users to wait for the new product – and FUD (Fear, 
Uncertainty, Doubt) – i.e. the diffusion of misleading and defamating information on competing 
products, aimed at decreasing end users’ willingness to pay for competing goods. In particular, 
Microsoft’s vaporware and FUD strategies were at the center of the often neglected Caldera v. 
Microsoft case, decided by District Judge Benson in 1999. See the main documents of the Caldera 
case at http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/network/2000/02/07/schulman.html (last visited: August 19, 
2004). 
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computers whose main role is to organize and manage network 
communication. Such powerful computers are normally termed “servers”, 
and the normal PCs interconnected onto a network are usually called 
“client PCs”. The need for communication between client PCs spurred the 
emergence of a wholly new market – that for server systems. A server 
system will typically include hardware devices, an operating system, 
middleware platforms and application software, mostly meant for 
facilitating the management of communication between interconnected 
users.  
There are two different ways to look at the server industry from the 
standpoint of competition policy. First, servers can be seen as stand-alone 
system goods (“reductionist” approach). Alternatively, servers can be seen 
under a “system good” approach, which considers them as part of wider 
system goods, in which servers are complementors as well as client PCs 
(“Holistic approach”).  
2.4.1 A “stand-alone” approach to servers  
When seen as stand-alone products, server systems do exhibit the same 
architectural issues of client PCs. Accordingly, the architecture of server 
systems can be more or less open, depending on the choice of system 
platform vendors. The server industry exhibits a different degree of 
openness when compared with the client PC systems. Server systems will 
be typically more proprietary and integrated than client PCs, as confirmed 
by market data on major players, such as Sun, IBM, Novell and others. This 
is the result of a different mix of market effects in this specific sector. In 
particular, the server industry exhibits less marked direct network 
externalities than the client PC sector. 
The market for OS installed on servers was at the core of the European 
Microsoft case. This market, however, is quite different from that of PC 
client OS that was scrutinized by the US authorities during the decade-long 
US v. Microsoft saga. It is of utmost importance to understand the difference 
between the two markets, for the purpose of assessing the merit of the 
Commission’s approach towards Microsoft’s conducts and their effects on 
the relevant markets.  
First, the server OS market does not seem to exhibit significant learning 
effects, since end users in this market are professional users, skilled enough 
ROBERTO PARDOLESI – ANDREA RENDA 
Draft – please do not cite 33
to invest their resources in learning how to use several different systems.68 
Secondly, the server OS market does not seem to be characterized by 
substantial network effects: most large networks use different brands and 
proprietary technologies merged within the same system.69 Finally, server 
OS products are seldom used as platforms for end-user applications, a fact 
that substantially limits their potential for spurring indirect network 
effects.70  
As a preliminary conclusion, under a “reductionist” approach, there seems 
to be little room for competitive concerns as regards tipping and monopoly 
crystallization in the server OS market. And this impression is confirmed 
by market data, which show no evidence of tipping: the server OS market 
is indeed more heterogeneous than the client OS one, and includes complex 
n-tier system architectures where many different server OS coexist, and 
many different technologies interoperate. Such a heterogeneous market 
environment becomes even more complex for the simultaneous presence of 
different business models, some based on competition for the market, 
others based on customization of standardized products.71  
Competition authorities will find it quite hard to detect the relative weight 
of different products in the same relevant market, and the calculation of 
market shares will necessarily produce uncertain and unreliable outcomes. 
This is what happened in the European Microsoft case, as we will highlight 
in Section 3.1. Considering servers as complementors under a wider 
“system good” approach leads to a more reliable snapshot of the 
                                                     
68 The amount of switching costs, as economists normally observe, will certainly be lower once the 
user has already undergone substantial investments in acquiring general skills in a given subject. 
And market evidence suggests that “sysops” (professional system operators) are often skilled in 
more than one programming language as well as in the operation of more than one server OS. 
Economists have learnt about the virtues of “acquiring general skills” as a strategy that minimizes 
learning investments since the seminal contribution provided by George Stigler, The Economics of 
Information, 69 Journal of Political Economy, 1961, 213.  
69 The European Commission adopted a fairly different view of network effects in the workgroup 
server market, by stating that “[t]he client PC operating system market, as well as the two other 
markets relevant to this case are characterised by strong direct and/or indirect network effects”. 
See the Commission’s decision, supra note 2, §1062.  
70 Of course, server OS also support applications. However, such applications are normally 
developed ad-hoc for large network operators, whereas in smaller networks, all applications are 
usually installed on client PCs.  
71 On competing business models in the server industry, see supra, note 60. Detailed descriptions 
are also provided by Bernard Reddy and David S. Evans, Government Preferences for Promoting 
Open-Source Software: A Solution in Search of a Problem (May 21, 2002), ssrn.com/abstract=313202, as 
well as by K. M. Schmidt and M. Schnitzer, Public Subsidies for Open Source? Some Economic Policy 
Issues, Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, 16(2), 2002, 473-505. 
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competitive pressure exerted by industry players on apparently dominant 
firms.  
2.4.2 Servers as complementors 
If one considers servers as complementors in a server system, the 
perspective (and the consequences for competition policy) changes 
substantially. Server systems are valuable to their users insofar as they can 
effectively connect client PCs. Ensuring client-to-server interoperability is 
therefore crucial for effective marketing of a server system. In complex 
network architectures, server-to-server interoperability is also crucial, since 
servers that can communicate with other servers will be more easily 
employed in articulated, n-tier system architectures that involve use of 
servers based of different technologies.  
2.4.2.1 Client-to-server interoperability 
In order to have a client PC communicate with a server, the two systems 
need to be “talking the same language”. Computer experts would suggest 
that there are four main ways in which client-to-server interoperability can 
be provided when clients and servers are not based on the same 
technology: 
• Web-based protocols: server OS and client OS based on different 
technologies can share non-native common protocols. All server 
applications that use Web-based protocols can interoperate with 
virtually any client.72 
• Gateway servers: these servers act as virtual interpreters, able to 
translate the language used by the client in order to ensure 
interoperability with the server, and viceversa.73  
• Software added on client: Client PC vendors install access software on 
client computers so that they can speak the “language” used by servers 
in the network.74  
                                                     
72 Server applications often use HTML or XML, the standard languages of the Internet, to 
communicate with clients. Client OS normally are sufficiently equipped to use HTML or XML, 
either because they include ad hoc software or simply through a Web browser. 
73 Such an approach is normally endorsed by major industry players for the purpose of achieving 
client-to-server interoperability. 
74 For instance, Microsoft provides software that enables its clients to connect to a server based on 
Novell’s NetWare as well as on variants of UNIX protocols such as NFS and NIS. And Novell 
markets client software that governs the interoperability between Windows client and NetWare’s 
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• Software added on server. On the other hand, servers can also be 
designed with an ability to speak different languages used by clients.75  
Each of these systems allows for communication between client PCs and 
server systems. However, all these interoperability mechanisms entail 
additional application software and/or the installation of additional 
devices that govern  client-to-server communication. This in turn shows 
that, as a matter of fact, only when a server and a client computer are 
designed with the same technology and share the same communication 
protocols, interoperability can be achieved immediately and at no cost. In 
this case, the operating system layers of both the server and the client 
computer can easily exchange files and interoperate for the purpose of 
performing a wide array of tasks. In all other cases, interoperability will be 
inevitably costly.76 
Is this conclusion equivalent to a declaration of surrender in the attempt to 
achieve perfect communication between servers and clients based on 
different technologies? If this were true, under a system-good approach, 
the de facto standard operating system in the client PC industry would 
necessarily end up dictating the technology adopted by server systems. 
Experience and market data, however, testify that Microsoft client PC 
operating systems do interoperate with non-Microsoft server operating 
systems. Hence, interoperability achieved through any of the four ways 
listed above has proven sufficient to create a market in which server groups 
are highly heterogeneous, and large networks contain a number of different 
technologies that interoperate with one another.  
                                                                                                                                       
NDC network directory system. Even Sun, with its Solstice client, is reported to be marketing 
software whose main functionality is to ensure interoperability with other server technologies. 
75 This approach has been widely upheld by Sun during the past few years, especially through the 
PC NetLink software shipped with the operating system Solaris, which enables network users to 
interoperate almost perfectly with Windows-based clients. See Solaris PC NetLink Software, 
available online at http://www.sun.com/interoperability/netlink/index.html, which states, “Solaris PC 
NetLink supports all major Windows client operating system releases, including Windows NT 
4.0, Windows 95/98, Windows 2000.”  
76 An example will allow us to clarify this concept. Imagine two individuals who speak different 
languages, say French and German. How can communication be ensured between the two? First, 
the French-speaking could invest some resources in learning German, and this will allow her to 
communicate (although far from perfectly) with the other individual. Secondly, the German-
speaking might invest resources in order to learn how to speak French. Thirdly, both individuals 
can speak in a third language, say English or Italian. Fourthly, they can hire an interpreter that 
will facilitate communication. Of the prospected solutions, the only one that would allow for 
perfect communication without additional investments is the fifth – i.e., none of the four. Perfect 
communication can be achieved at no cost only if the two individuals speak the same language. 
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Notwithstanding such evidence, as will be explained in further detail in the 
next section, the European Commission has stated that the only way to 
ensure full interoperability between clients and servers is to ensure that 
they act as if they were based on the same technology, by allowing a full 
specification of the APIs contained in the server OS, which govern 
interoperability between clients and servers, and opening the door to de 
facto perfect emulation of Microsoft OS products.77  
2.4.2.2 Server-to-server interoperability 
Considering servers as complementors also leads to tackling the issue of 
communication between servers based on different technologies, besides 
hinging on the need to have clients and servers communicate. Server-to-
server interoperability becomes important whenever networks are complex 
and articulated enough to require more than one server system for the 
purpose of governing communication between client PCs. Large networks 
normally are structured along n-tier architectures, with different tiers 
containing servers based on different technologies and dedicated to 
different tasks. Firms wishing to use large networks have the choice of 
setting up a whole network based on one technology, or to resort to 
different technologies for performance of different tasks.78  
When networks are heterogeneous, server-to-server interoperability needs 
to be ensured either by sharing interface information, by adopting common 
standards or by resorting to external applications which act as 
intermediaries between the two technologies, making them interoperable. 
As we already recalled, market data confirm that the server OS market is 
much less subject to tipping than the client OS one, and is populated by 
large networks in which servers based on different technologies 
interoperate with one another and with Windows-based clients.  
Under a “system good approach”, competition authorities are in charge of 
ascertaining that the peculiar market environment in the key layer – the 
client OS one – does not end up dictating the technologies that will 
dominate other layers – in the case at hand, the server OS market. Under 
this wider perspective, the server OS market ends up closely resembling an 
aftermarket, where the demand is driven by the decisions taken by end 
                                                     
77 See infra, note 100 and accompanying text.  
78 Such tasks include domain control, file and server services, group and authentication services, 
mission-critical applications and many others. 
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users in the primary market – the market for client OS.79 The extent to 
which the secondary market equilibrium can be harmfully affected by the 
competitive environment observed in the primary market strongly depends 
on the aftermarket’s tendency to tip, as well as on the behaviour of the firm 
that dominates the primary market. Although  server-to-server and  client-
to-server interoperability were under the spotlight in the EU Microsoft 
case, the Commission failed to realize that the peculiarities of the server OS 
(after-)market hardly spurred serious competitive concerns, and that – for 
reasons that included network and learning effects – market data revealed 
that the dominant technology in the primary market did not dictate the 
dominant technology in the aftermarket.  
3 THE COMMISSION’S CASE 
The European Commission’s case against Microsoft started in 1998, after a 
complaint filed by Sun Microsystems, one of Microsoft’s rivals in the server 
OS market. Since then, the Commission has issued three Statements of 
Objections. As we already explained in Section 2, the allegations expressed 
by the Commission against Microsoft are basically two.  
First, according to the Commission, Microsoft refused to supply interface 
information contained in its work group server OS, which competitors 
would need in order to achieve full interoperability with Microsoft 
Windows client OS. More in detail, Microsoft is alleged to have preserved 
hidden, privileged connections between its products on the client and on 
the server side in order to hamper competitors in the work group server OS 
market. Since Microsoft holds a dominant position in the client OS market, 
rivals in the work group server OS market would find themselves 
foreclosed from the relevant market if the Redmond-based company does 
not disclose the necessary interface information for client-to-server 
interoperability. 80  
                                                     
79 The notion of aftermarket has come under the spotlight in economic theory since the famous 
Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Services, Inc. 514 US 451 (1992). See, i.a., Dennis Carlton and 
Michael Waldman, Competition, Monopoly and Aftermarkets, NBER Working Paper 8086, 2001; and 
Borenstein, S., J. Mackie-Mason, and J. Netz, Antitrust Policy in Aftermarkets, Antitrust Law 
Journal, 1995, 63, 455-482. 
80 See Commission’s decision, at §1064: “As regards the refusal to supply abuse, Microsoft has 
engaged in a general pattern of conduct which focuses on the creation and sole exploitation of a 
range of privileged connections between its dominant client PC operating system and its work 
group server operating system, and on the disruption of previous levels of interoperability. The 
interoperability information at stake is indispensable for competitors to be able to viably compete 
in the work group server operating system market.” (emphasis in original). 
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Furthermore, the Commission alleged that Microsoft unduly bundled 
Windows with an application software for media streaming, Windows 
Media Player. By technologically integrating the media player into the 
operating system, Microsoft de facto forced OEMs to preinstall Windows 
Media Player on their machines. End users, hence, inevitably found 
Microsoft’s software for media streaming already installed on their PCs. 
Such circumstance, according to the Commission, determined a substantial 
lessening of competition on the merits in the media player market, such 
that competitors would be gradually foreclosed from the market, leaving 
Microsoft with the possibility of plodding along with low-quality products 
and drown in x-inefficiency, to the detriment of end users.  
On these bases, the Commission decided that Microsoft should be bound to 
disclose relevant interface information to competitors in the server OS 
market – so that they can achieve “full interoperability” with PC Client 
Windows OS and Windows server OS – and to market a stripped-down 
version of Windows, which does not integrate the Media Player – so that 
competing media players are not foreclosed from the market.  
3.1 REFUSAL TO SUPPLY INTERFACE INFORMATION: HEAVY 
CLOUDS, NO RAIN... 
The European Commission’s allegation that Microsoft infringed article 82 
of the EC Treaty by abusing its dominant position in the market for PC 
client OS and in the market for work group server OS is based on 
Microsoft’s incomplete disclosure of information relative to “specifications 
for the protocols used by Windows work group servers in order to provide 
[...] services to Windows work group networks”81. Microsoft’s strategy 
allegedly consisted in preserving privileged connections between its client 
PC operating system and its work group server operating system, in order 
to retain a comparative advantage over rivals such as Sun, Novell, IBM and 
others for what concerns client-to-server and server-to-server 
interoperability. Such privileged connections are related to the main tasks 
normally performed by work group servers, such as group and user 
administration services and file and print services. 
Group and user administration services that are best performed by 
Windows server operating systems include: a) directory services, which are 
provided by Active Directory in Windows domains; b) trust relationships 
services, which Windows performs through the Global Catalogue service; 
                                                     
81 See the Commission’s decision, supra note 2, at §187. 
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c) security and authentication services, which Microsoft provides through its 
implementation of the Kerberos protocol82; and d) group management 
services, which Microsoft implements through its Group Policy feature.  
On the other hand, file and print services listed by the Commission include: 
a) network file systems, which Microsoft provides through its CIFS/SMB; 
and b) distributed file systems, represented by Microsoft’s Dfs.  
The Commission specifies that both categories of services are provided by 
Microsoft as a “set of interrelated services”.83 This stems from the fact that 
most file and print services use the Kerberos protocol for authentication, 
and rely on the ability to create Access Control Lists for users wishing to 
avail of those services on a Windows network - something only a Windows 
OS can achieve.84 Through an allegedly incomplete disclosure of this set of 
interrelated services, Microsoft was able to leverage its dominant position 
in the client OS market, achieving a parallel dominant position in the work 
group server OS market.  
Yet, the story does not end up here. According to the Commission, the lack 
of sufficient interoperability between non-Microsoft server operating 
systems and Windows operating systems that run on client PCs also 
depends on a number of specifications contained in Windows client OS, not 
only in Windows server OS. More precisely, “there is in many cases 
symmetry between server-to-server and client-to-server interconnection 
and interaction”.85 This occurs since, “[i]n order to transparently deliver 
their services to the client PC user, Windows work group servers use the 
presence of specific pieces of software code in the Windows client PC 
operating system”.86 Such pieces of code are related to Microsoft’s Dfs and 
to Active Directory. 
Finally, in other cases client-to-server and server-to-server communication 
is implemented in Windows domains by means of the same “hidden” 
protocols. On this point, the Commission mentions the Kerberos protocol 
and the ADSI interface, defined as “[t]he primary and recommended API 
for accessing Active Directory”.87  
                                                     
82 Id., at §§251-272. Before the marketing of Windows 2000, Microsoft used the so-called NT LAN 
Manager (NTLM), released by Microsoft back in 1989, for authentication services. See Id. at §152. 
83 Id., at §176 (emphasis in original).  
84 Id. 
85 Id., at §179. 
86 Id., at §176. 
87 Id., at §§246 and note 327. 
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Since both client-to-server and server-to-server interoperability were at 
stake, the Commission concluded that Microsoft should be bound to 
disclose information contained in both server and client OS, in order to 
facilitate full interoperability between non-Windows servers and both 
Windows server and Windows clients.  
The Commission’s decision never mentions the issue of monopoly 
leveraging as playing a significant role in Microsoft’s strategy. But it is 
evident that the contested infringement is one of technological leveraging. 
And it is also evident that the Commission hinged – although implicitly – 
on the so-called essential facility doctrine in order to overcome the problem 
of Microsoft’s intellectual property rights while imposing mandatory 
disclosure of information otherwise protected by copyright, patent rights or 
trade secrecy.  
As a matter of fact, in the first two Statements of Objections, the 
Commission explicitly based its whole case on an allegation of 
technological leveraging of Microsoft’s paramount position in the client OS 
market, with the intermediate aim of monopolizing the work group server 
OS market, and the ultimate one of preserving its quasi-monopoly position 
in the client OS market. In the Statements of Objections and in the Final 
Decision, the Commission extensively applied the Tetra Pak II case as 
closely matching the kind of strategy allegedly implemented by 
Microsoft.88 
As we already recalled, the technological leveraging allegation initially 
involved also a leveraging of Microsoft’s paramount position in the market 
for client PPAs (Personal Productivity Applications), where the Office Suite 
dominates competing products.89 According to the Commission, Microsoft 
willingly preserved hidden and privileged connections between client 
PPAs and its server OS, so that a number of tasks performed by Microsoft 
server OS on Microsoft PPAs could not be equally performed by using a 
non-Microsoft server OS. Such an allegation was later released by the 
Commission.  
As regards the essential facility doctrine, its importance in the 
Commission’s rationale emerges from the caselaw quoted in the final 
decision. As widely known, decisions like Magill and – more recently – IMS 
                                                     
88 Id., at §§527-529. The Commission is clear in stating that “[a] comparison of the relevant 
operating system markets and an evaluation of Microsoft’s position on both reveals a degree of 
inter-relation which is similar to the one that was found to prevail in Tetra Pak II”. Id. at §529. 
89 See supra, Section 1.2, footnote 30 and accompanying text. 
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Health imply that a dominant player’s refusal to supply IPR-protected 
information may be deemed anticompetitive only in exceptional 
circumstances. More precisely, in Magill the exercise of an exclusive right 
by a dominant undertaking was found to represent an abusive conduct 
whenever: a) the refusal prevented the emergence of a new product – 
better, a new market; b) the firm’s conduct had the effect of foreclosing 
competitors from a secondary market; and c) the refusal was not objectively 
justified. Similarly, in Bronner – although the contested conduct did not 
involve withholding of IPR-protected information – the refusal to open the 
distribution system was found to be infringing article 82 of the EC Treaty 
only when such system is essential to carry on business in the relevant 
market, the refusal is likely to eliminate all competition and is not 
objectively justified. The latter conditions appear quite challenging and 
restrictive, if compared with the Commission’s case in Microsoft. 
Nevertheless, the Commission stated that its approach in the case at hand 
is consistent with Bronner, and specified that the set of exceptional 
circumstances listed in Magill should not be held as a numerus clausus.90 In 
other words, the Commission claimed its freedom to evaluate further 
details of the contested conduct, which might lead to concluding that the 
dominant undertaking actually abused its market position, even when the 
exceptional circumstances listed in Magill or Bronner are not met.  
The Commission also quoted cases like Volvo, Commercial Solvents and 
Micro Leader Business, in which a comprehensive analysis of the defendant’s 
behaviour had led the Commission to identify an infringement of article 
82.91 The main criterion adopted by the Commission in the analysis of 
Microsoft’s refusal to supply interface information – in particular, to Sun 
Microsystems – is the evidence that the dominant firm’s behaviour “puts 
Microsoft’s competitors at a strong competitive disadvantage in the work 
group server operating system market, to the extent where there is a risk of 
elimination of competition”, which accounts for one of the three 
“exceptional circumstances” listed in Bronner.92   
                                                     
90 The Commission states that “[i]ndeed, disclosure of interface information by Microsoft is 
indispensable for competitors in the work group server operating system market to carry on 
business. Microsoft’s behaviour of progressively diminishing such disclosures risks eliminating 
competition in the market and cannot be objectively justified.” See Commission’s decision, supra 
note 2, footnote 670 and accompanying text.  
91 “[T]he factual situations where the exercise of an exclusive right by an intellectual property 
right-holder may constitute an abuse of a dominant position cannot be restricted to one particular 
set of circumstances”. Id., at §557 (emphasis in original). 
92 Id., at §589. 
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As we will explain in the next sections, many of the logical steps followed 
by the Commission in the competitive assessment of Microsoft’s conduct in 
the server market appear quite criticizable and evanescent. In what follows, 
we will focus on three main issues, namely the Commission’s market 
definition exercise, the technological leveraging allegation and the 
Commission’s assessment of Microsoft’s refusal to supply interface 
information. 
3.1.1 “Acrobatic” Market Definition  
As we already recalled, the European Commission found Microsoft to have 
infringed article 82 by illegally leveraging its dominant position in the PC 
client OS market into the market for low-level server OS. Such an 
infringement may be sanctioned both under an essential facility label and a 
technological leveraging approach. Whatever is chosen, in order to assess 
the Commission’s decision one piece of evidence needs to be ascertained: 
the defendant ought to enjoy a dominant position in the relevant market. 
For this reason, the Commission’s market definition exercise becomes of 
utmost importance in the overall evaluation of the case. But what is the 
relevant market in Microsoft? 
Initially, the Commission decided to identify a separate relevant market for 
operating systems installed on so-called entry-level servers, as defined by 
the International Data Corporation, the leading market data provider for 
high-tech industries. Entry-level servers were identified with systems 
costing less than 100,000 USD.93 For this set of products to be defined as a 
relevant market, according to the Commission’s 1997 Notice on the definition 
of the relevant market, no other product should be “regarded as 
interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the 
products’ characteristics, their prices and their intended use”.94 This market 
definition, however, was heavily criticized during the proceeding, for a 
number of reasons.  
As a first remark, the Commission was not segmenting the market on the 
basis of prices charged for server OS, but relied on prices charged for entire 
systems, composed – as we showed in Section 2 – by hardware, OS, 
Middleware, Applications etc. Work group servers and larger network 
servers normally differ in terms of hardware, rather than software. Larger 
servers normally come with more memory storage, more powerful 
                                                     
93 See supra, note 31 and accompanying text.  
94 European Commission, Commission Notice on the Definition of the Relevant Market for the Purposes 
of Community Competition Law, Official Journal, OJ C372, 9 December 1997. 
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processors, more sophisticated security devices, higher interconnection 
capacity. On the other hand, the OS core technology is normally the same 
for work group servers and larger network servers.  
Sure, OSs sold for larger network servers differ, to some extent, from 
workgroup server OSs. As in many markets for information goods, OS 
vendors normally engage in versioning of their products, which enables 
them to price-discriminate between different categories of server users.95 
OSs are anyway developed on a common core technology, and then made – 
in the techies’ jargon - “scalable”. OSs marketed for larger servers are able 
to interconnect more servers and more clients than those used by work 
group server sysops.96 But this in turn implies that, should a hypothetical 
monopolist slightly raise its price in the workgroup server sub-market, 
immediate entry would inhibit whatever chance of reaping extra-profits. 
When this test – called the SSNIP test – fails, antitrust practitioners 
conclude that the relevant market should be enlarged in order to embrace 
also firms that would immediately enter the market.  
Finally, add that, in a system architecture, normally one large server 
substitutes for many small servers, depending on the free choice of system 
operators. There are advantages and disadvantages in both available 
network architectures. In other words, even if we reason in terms of 
systems, there is a clear pattern of substitution between systems that were 
included in the relevant market and systems that were excluded from it. 
And this is contrary to sound economic theory as regards market definition 
exercises.  
In conclusion, the debate on the Commission’s market definition exercise 
highlighted that there seemed to be no separate relevant market for entry-
level server OSs. More importantly, had the market been defined as the 
wider server OS market, evidence suggests that Microsoft would have 
come out with a much lower market share, certainly smaller that that held 
by the UNIX family of Operating Systems.97 As a result, the whole rationale 
adopted by the European Commission – be that based on a technological 
                                                     
95 On versioning, see supra, note 66 and accompanying text. 
96 The retail price for Windows server family of products normally depends on the number of 
clients (better, Client Access Licences or CALs) that can be interconnected by the individual OS. 
The Commission reported in detail the number of CALs supported by Windows server OS and 
the corresponding price. See the Commission’s decision, supra note 2, at §§371-373 and Tables 3-4. 
97 During the proceeding, data on revenue-based shares were provided by Microsoft on the basis 
of IDC Worldwide Client and Server Operating Environments Market Forecast and Analysis Summary, 
2001-2005, Report #25118, August 2001. 
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leveraging or on a refusal to supply allegation – was inevitably doomed to 
tumble down, just like castles made of sand. 
For this reason, during the proceeding, the Commission modified its 
definition of the relevant market. The result is an even narrower market, 
defined as operating systems installed on “work group servers”. The 
difference between work group servers and other servers is twofold. On the 
one hand, work group servers belong to a specific price band – servers 
costing less than 25,000 USD. On the other hand, the Commission’s new 
market definition is task-based, meaning that the tasks normally 
accomplished by work group servers are substantially different from those 
performed by other, higher-level servers. More in detail, work group 
servers normally provide file and print services and group and user 
administration services, whereas higher-end servers normally are 
dedicated to mission-critical applications.  
Despite this attempt to reshape the definition of the relevant market, we 
still argue that the main problems encountered by the first market 
definition exercise by the Commission have not been solved. Such a patent 
clumsiness in dealing with market definition issues calls for more sound 
economic research and analysis in Brussels. In particular, the Commission 
failed to adopt a “system good” approach, which would have prompted a 
more reliable picture of the relative weight of competing producers in the 
relevant market. The possibility of adopting a “Gillette strategy” in markets 
where direct network and learning effects are not significant opens up the 
market door to many potential competitors. All-time giants such as IBM 
and Sun already switched to this new business model, and seem to be 
reaping their humongous investments by charging supracompetitive prices 
for aftermarket IT services provided to their fidelized customers.98 A 
standard market definition exercise would certainly fail to take this form of 
competition into account.  
3.1.1.1 “Creative” calculation of market shares 
The gray picture that emerges from the Commission’s market definition 
exercise in Microsoft becomes even darker, if one looks at the way market 
shares were computed during the proceeding. The European Commission 
chose to calculate market shares on a volume basis, rather than relying on 
value or revenues. Below, we explain why we find this approach to be at 
least regrettable.  
                                                     
98 See supra, note 60 and accompanying text. 
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As a matter of fact, even the narrow work group server market is highly 
heterogeneous, and includes products with different business models,  
price levels, technologies and task specializations. Economists suggest that 
in heterogeneous markets volume-based shares may constitute an 
extremely imperfect proxy of firms’ relative strength. The Commission 
itself shared this approach in a number of decisions, even when the 
relevant market was characterized by strong network effects (as in 
MCI/Worldcom)99. The 1997 Notice on the definition of the relevant market for the 
purposes of Community’s competition law specifies that, “[i]n cases of 
differentiated products, sales in value and their associated market shares 
will usually be considered to better reflect the relative position and strength 
of each supplier”.100  
Nevertheless, two main reasons led the Commission to initially rely on 
volume-based rather than value-based (revenue-based) market shares in 
determining Microsoft’s relative competitive position in the relevant 
market. First, the Commission stated that network effects are related to 
numbers in use, not in dollars. This implies that, in order to fully take into 
account network externalities, emphasis must be put on the undertaking’s 
installed base, i.e. on the number of users that actually choose to make use 
of the firm’s product. Secondly, the Commission recalled that a relevant 
part of the operating systems marketed in the relevant market is 
distributed under a free software license. Accordingly, calculating revenue-
based market shares would lead to necessarily understating the market 
share held by Linux and other open source operating systems. 101  
Although these reflections are appropriate, the approach adopted by the 
Commission seems far from correct, for a number of reasons. As we 
already recalled, there is a clear pattern of substitution between one large 
server and many smaller servers. This means that calculating market shares 
on the basis of units sold provides an overly distorted picture of the relative 
competitive position of server OS vendors, and leads to unduly overstating 
the market share held by vendors of OSs for smaller servers, such as 
Microsoft. Such conclusion is strengthened by the inherent and ubiquitous 
scalability that characterizes server OSs as they are marketed today.  
In summary, there seems to be no reason to abandon a Commission’s 
almost consolidated approach just for the Microsoft case. This conclusion 
appears even more important since Microsoft’s revenue-based share in OSs 
                                                     
99 Case IV/M.1069 WorldCom/MCI [1999] Official Journal L 116, pages 0001-0035 at §101. 
100 See the 1997 Notice on the definition of the relevant market, supra note 94.  
101 See the Commission’s Second SO, supra note 30, §121 and footnote 158. 
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for servers costing less than 100,000 USD was found to be much lower than 
that held by UNIX. Under this modified perspective, Microsoft indeed 
would appear far from dominant in the relevant market (so narrowly) 
defined by the Commission: the constellation of UNIX flavours would 
come out as holding a larger share than Microsoft.102 
In the Final Decision, the Commission significantly revised its approach to 
market share calculation, in order to respond to the criticisms elicited by its 
exclusive reliance on unit-based shares. After further narrowing its 
definition of the relevant market, from (price-based) entry-level server OS 
to (task- and price-based) work group server OS, the Commission provided 
figures both for volume-based and value-based shares. The Commission 
also provided volume-based shares relative to the market for OSs installed 
on servers costing less than 100,000 USD, but failed to provide value-based 
shares for this market. As a result, Microsoft was found to have achieved a 
dominant position in the market for work group server OSs, with a share of 
(at least) 60% in 2002.103  
Here again, we argue that the Commission should undertake extensive 
research on the approach to market share calculation in high-tech, path-
dependent markets. Firms adopting a “Gillette strategy” certainly came out 
of the market definition exercise with too low a share. And proprietary 
software vendors that adopt a “two-sided” market strategy had their share 
overstated and consequently were the subject of overly emphatic 
competitive concerns. In particular, the relative weight of products 
marketed with different business models should be carried out with an eye 
to each product’s total cost of ownership (TCO), more than relying on unit 
sold and/or revenues.104  
3.1.2 Technological leveraging 
We already stressed that the Commission’s case, although rephrased in 
terms of a refusal to supply allegation, hides a more substantial allegation 
of technological leveraging of Microsoft’s dominant position in the client 
OS market into the work group server OS market. In order to comply with 
                                                     
102 To complete the picture, please note that the Commission told a completely different story 
when it came to calculate market shares in the market for Personal Productivity Applications¸ a 
branch of the case that was later abandoned in Brussels. Notwithstanding the paramount 
importance of network effects in this market, the Commission decided to rely on value-based 
shares instead of hinging on unit-based shares. Strangely enough, in that market, Microsoft’s 
share is lower in terms of volume than in terms of revenues. 
103 See the Commission’s decision, supra note 2, at §499.  
104 On this issue, see Andrea Giannaccari and Andrea Renda, supra note 60.  
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the requirements of sound economic theory, a leveraging allegation must 
prove at least the following three elements.105 First, the defendant must 
hold a dominant position in the tying market. Secondly, the defendant 
must have achieved a dominant position in the tied market. Thirdly, a 
suitable tool for exercising leveraging from the tying to the tied market 
must have been available to the defendant. 
According to the Commission’s view expressed in the first two Statements 
of Objections, all three requirements are satisfied in the Microsoft case. 
Microsoft is undoubtedly dominant in the market for PC client OSs and has 
achieved dominance in the market for work group server OSs by means of 
a suitable tool, i.e. technological leveraging by withholding relevant 
interface information and preserving hidden, privileged connections 
between Microsoft client and server software products.  
As we already recalled, that the leveraging allegation still lies at the core of 
the Commission’s approach is confirmed by the reference to the (in)famous 
Tetra Pak II case in many passages of the Decision. In the Commission’s 
view, “[a]  comparison  of  the  relevant  operating  system  markets and  an  
evaluation  of Microsoft’s position on both reveals a degree of inter-relation 
which is similar to the one that was found to prevail in Tetra Pak II.”106 
Indeed, the Commission found Microsoft to be dominant in both the client 
PC OS market and in the workgroup server OS market on the basis of the 
“closely associative links” existing between the two relevant markets as 
well as on the following findings: a) a substantial proportion of customers 
had purchased both Windows Server OS and Client OS; b) Microsoft is a 
quasi-monopolist of client OS, with approximately 90% of the market, c) 
the main producers operated on both markets; and d) by virtue of its quasi-
monopoly, Microsoft was able to focus its competitive efforts on the server 
OS market without fear of retaliation in the client OS market.107 The 
Commission also noted the existence of technological links, in addition to 
commercial links, between the two relevant product markets, stemming 
from the interdependence of servers and clients within computer 
networks.108  
However, if Tetra Pak II is a precedent applicable to Microsoft, it is an 
ominous one. As a matter of fact, Tetra Pak II was heavily criticized because, 
in spite of the “leveraging” allegation, the contested abuse and the effect of 
                                                     
105 See, e.g., Michael Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 837 (1990). 
106 See Commission’s decision, supra note 2, at §529 
107 Id., at §527. 
108 Id., at §533 
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the abuse occurred in one and the same market, the so-called tied market, 
where no hegemony had been found: on the one hand, leveraging should 
not be resorted to in order to avoid the critical task of proving a dominance 
to be abused; on the other hand, the mere fact that a monopolist in one 
market benefits from that monopoly while competing in a second market is 
not, in and of itself, unlawful.109 Here, as in Tetra Pak II, the Commission is 
scrutinizing a conduct that was adopted by Microsoft in the market for 
work group server OSs. And the remedies sought mostly concern the 
“tied” market, not the “tying” market. 
At any rate, Tetra Pak II could at most represent the starting point for an 
allegation that Microsoft has willfully limited client-to-server 
interoperability by failing to disclose interface information contained in its 
client OS to competing producers of server OSs. But, as far as server-to-
server interoperability is concerned, it suffices to say that there can be no 
leveraging within the same market. Since the Commission imposed 
Microsoft a duty to disclose interface information contained – for the most 
part – in the server OS, rather than in the client OS, the “Tetra Pak II 
fallacy” seems to have permeated the Commission once and again.  
On balance, we consider the Commission’s allegation of illegal 
technological leveraging in Microsoft as misconceived, with specific 
emphasis on the reference to server-to-server interoperability. Precisely the 
fact that server-to-server communication was constantly under the 
spotlight in the Microsoft case might, after all, cast doubts on the 
Commission’s original intentions. There is, as we will shortly see, room to 
believe the Commission was initially willing to impose disclosure of 
copyrighted information to rivals, in order to allow – more than for mere 
interoperability – for perfect emulation of Microsoft’s copyrighted 
products. Something got wrong along the way… 
3.1.3 Refusal to deal with rivals in the post-Trinko era 
As we just recalled, in the Final Decision the Commission decided to 
abandon the allegation of technological leveraging, embracing refusal to 
supply as the main abuse purported by Microsoft in violation of article 82. 
Of course, such an allegation implies that a number of elements be proven, 
                                                     
109 See e.g., Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner, at 15, Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 124 S.Ct. 872 
(2004) (No. 02-682), specifying that “conduct is not exclusionary or predatory unless it would 
make no economic sense for the defendant but for its tendency to eliminate or lessen 
competition.”  
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as was specified by the rationale of the European Court of Justice in Magill, 
Bronner and, more recently, IMS Health.110 First, Microsoft must be found to 
hold an essential input for competitors wishing to operate in a secondary or 
adjacent market – in this case, the market for work group server OSs. Such 
input must be essential to the point that entry in the secondary market 
should be unfeasible without “reasonable access” to the infrastructure. 
Secondly, Microsoft’s abusive conduct must have created a substantial risk 
of elimination of competition from the secondary market. Thirdly, the 
refusal to supply interface information must not have been objectively 
justified.   
In our opinion, to assert that the three elements are present in Microsoft 
means walking on a quite tortuous path, if not on a tightrope. In particular, 
three main issues stand against any attempt to consistently apply the 
doctrine of refusal to deal with rivals to the EU Microsoft case. First, we 
question that the interface information withheld by Microsoft is essential to 
carry on business in the relevant market, however oddly such market is 
defined. Market data testify that client-to-server interoperability is actually 
achieved in the server market’s everyday life.111 As a result, we 
acknowledge that a fuller specification of Windows APIs would be 
important for competitors, but not essential to carry on business. In other 
words, there are heavy doubts on the “essential nature” of the interface 
information contained in Windows 2000 server as well as in other server 
OSs marketed by Microsoft.  
Secondly, Microsoft’s refusal to deal with rivals is objectively justified, in 
that it corresponds to a legitimate exercise of Microsoft’s intellectual 
property rights, namely its copyright on Windows source code. Microsoft’s 
refusal to disclose interface information is perfectly justified by its need not 
to offer its rivals the chance to take a wonderful free ride on information 
developed after gazillion investments in R&D. There is extensive caselaw 
on the opportunity of forcing market winners to disclose their intellectual 
property, including the famous Kodak and Xerox litigations.112 The 
Commission allegation seems to fall short of what established by the most 
recent caselaw on refusal to deal with rivals, on both sides of the Atlantic. 
In the US, the recent Supreme Court decision in Verizon v. Trinko 
                                                     
110 Judgment in Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, RTE and ITP v Commission (1995), ECR I-
743; Judgment in Case C-7/97, Bronner (1998) ECR I-7791; Judgment in Case C-418/01, IMS v 
NDC, 29 April 2004.  
111 See supra, Section 2.4.1.2. 
112 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 US 451 (1992); and CSU v. Xerox, 203 
F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000)  
FOOL MONTI KILLS BILL? 
Draft – please do not cite 50
significantly restricted the scope for alleging the anticompetitiveness of a 
dominant undertaking’s refusal to aid competitors.113 In the EU, the Court 
of Justice recently released its final decision in IMS Health, recalling that the 
three cumulative conditions listed in Magill and Bronner should be 
interpreted strictly, and that there must be at least a hypothetical secondary 
market in which the abusive conduct implemented by the defendant 
determines a foreclosure effect.114 
Thirdly, Microsoft’s refusal to supply information did not prevent the 
emergence of a new product. As a matter of fact, Sun and other competitors 
were not trying to market a newly developed software product. In other, 
simpler words, Microsoft’ conduct created no bottleneck for the emergence 
of a new market, for which there was sufficient user demand: here, 
Microsoft rivals just wanted to ensure costless and perfect interoperability 
of their (already existing) products with Windows client OS.  
Fourthly, Microsoft’s conduct is certainly far from having determined a 
serious risk of foreclosing competitors from the relevant market. Market 
data confirm that most market players – in particular, Sun Microsystems – 
had performed quite well in terms of sales and profits over the timeframe 
under scrutiny. Most market players appeared quite healthy and far from 
considering exit from the market. As we already recalled, an observation of 
the normal practice in the relevant market reveals that most computer 
networks interconnect server OSs based on a number of different 
technologies, mixing open source software such as Linux with proprietary 
software such as Windows or NetWare. And again, most industry players 
are adopting a different business model, based on the cross-subsidization 
of core products with revenues from aftermarkets or from other bundled 
hardware/software, which appears as a powerful new mode of 
competition in the server industry.115  
Finally, one should not neglect the difference existing between Microsoft 
and other cases in which a refusal to supply was challenged. Here, unlike 
what occurred in Volvo, Magill, Bronner and IMS Health, the contested 
conduct took place in the secondary market, not in the primary one. In 
                                                     
113 See Verizon v. Trinko, supra note 109. For an updated comment, see David S. Evans and A. Jorge 
Padilla, Neo-Chicago Economics, available online at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/Antitrust/ 
Evans-Padilla.pdf (last visited: August 19, 2004). 
114 See supra, note 111.  
115 See supra, note 60. In particular, Sun Microsystems bundles the OS with hardware, such as its 
SPARC processor; IBM also bundles the Linux OS with its hardware, software and services. 
Finally, firms such as SuSe, Red Hat or Caldera bundle Linux with the provision of additional 
software and IT services.   
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other words, the essential information to be disclosed to rivals belongs 
specifically to the design of the server OS, a product that has countless 
rivals in its relevant market, however the latter is defined.  
Many are therefore the questions that remain unsolved in Microsoft. In 
particular, as was authoritatively recalled in the immediate aftermath of the 
Commission’s decision, it is still unclear whether Windows should be 
treated as an essential facility.116 More importantly, is Windows server an 
essential facility? If not – as seems fair to conclude –, what is the ultimate 
aim of forcing Microsoft to disclose interface information and specifications 
mostly contained in its server OS, if not that of allowing for perfect 
emulation of Microsoft’s copyrighted products? 
3.1.4 Conclusion: full of bugs? 
The Commission’s rationale seems to hinge on nebulous logical steps, 
when not on flawed economics. As we explained in this section, the 
Commission relied on an acrobatic market definition, on a degree of 
creativeness in the calculation of market shares, on a flawed interpretation 
of the technological leveraging doctrine, and finally on a misconceived 
application of the refusal to supply doctrine typically referred to essential 
facility holders.  
What is left for us to stress is that the Commission ended up providing a 
shortsighted approach to the concept of interoperability. As a matter of 
fact, the Commission referred to the concept of “full interoperability” as 
implying a disclosure of Microsoft Windows’ source code for most of the 
proceeding. In other words, amongst the existing solutions available to 
achieve interoperability between servers and clients based on different 
technologies (Web-based protocols, gateway servers, add-on client 
software, add-on server software), the Commission considered the “open 
Windows” solution as the only one providing for full client-to-server and 
server-to-server interoperability at no cost.117 For this reason, the 
Commission initially stated its intention to force Microsoft to open up part 
of its source code to rivals. “Microsoft should promptly make available … all the 
interface information necessary to enable full interoperability … such information 
being not less complete, less accurate nor less clearly presented than that which is 
available to Microsoft’s employees… for the purpose of developing or improving 
                                                     
116 See Giuliano Amato, Some comments on Rudolph Peritz’s and Roberto Pardolesi’s view of the 
European Microsoft case, available online at www.law-economics.net.  
117 See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
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Microsoft Workgroup Server OS…”.118 According to this view, 
interoperability means awareness of rivals’ source code.  
Even with the second Statement of Objections, the Commission clarified 
that Microsoft should not only disclose the information contained in the 
interfaces, but also the way in which it implemented such interfaces for the 
purpose of achieving full client-to-server and server-to-server 
interoperability.119 
This interpretation seems to have been substantially reversed during the 
proceeding. Between the lines of the final Decision, no trace of the 
Commission’s intention to force source code disclosure is left. What’s more, 
the Commission clarified in several occasions that Microsoft’s disclosure 
obligations should not be as far-reaching as to involve disclosure of 
Microsoft’s specific implementation of its APIs. The magic word used by 
Monti’s team to express this new, milder obligation is that of 
“specification”, as opposed to “implementation”.  As a result, Microsoft is 
ordered to disclose interface specifications, but not its source code.  
In conclusion, it is not clear where the line between information that 
Microsoft must disclose and information that Microsoft can avoid to 
disclose should be drawn. At first blush, it seems that the Commission’s 
decision has not provided a significant contribution to the wording of the 
consent decree already signed between Microsoft and the US DoJ. 
Following that consent decree, as we recalled in Section 1, Microsoft started 
a Communication Protocol Licensing Programme, aimed at licensing at 
RAND conditions interface information needed “for the purpose of 
achieving interoperability” between Microsoft clients and non-Microsoft 
server OSs.120 A closer look at the Commission’s case suggests that Monti’s 
team remained slave of its own mistakes in assessing Microsoft’s alleged 
abusive conducts in the server OS market. And it is at once inevitable and 
quite embarassing to conclude that Monti and his squad found no updated 
economic tools nor evident market facts that could reasonably lead to 
forcing Microsoft to disclose its own source code. For such reason, although 
the whole proceeding was characterized by heavy clouds on Microsoft’s 
                                                     
118 See the First SO, supra note 20, at §367. 
119 See the Second SO, supra note 20, at footnote 230.  
120 Sure, the MCPP does not imply disclosure of information aimed at ensuring server-to-server 
interoperability. The Commission seems to consider this limitation as an obstacle to restoring the 
level-playing field in the server industry. However, as we already explained in this Section, 
neither a technological leveraging allegation nor an essential facility approach can support 
mandatory disclosure of interface information contained in Windows server OS, aimed at 
ensuring server-to-server interoperability.  
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future disclosure obligations, no rain finally came down on Redmond. The 
Commission clarified that “[t]he interfaces do not concern the Windows 
source code as this is not necessary to achieve the development of 
interoperable products. The interfaces are the hooks at the edge of the 
source code which allow one product to talk to another”121. 
No doubt, the Commission’s decision might exert a substantial impact on 
the type of competition that will emerge in the industry in the coming 
years. As occurred in the US case, the mandatory disclosure of interface 
information will steer the market away from inter-system competition and 
lead it close to pure intra-system competition. This is good and bad news at 
the same time. It is good news because the Commission refrained from 
imposing disclosure of Windows source code, as seemed likely to be the 
case during the course of the proceeding. It is bad news because the 
features (no direct network externalities, no learning effects) and the recent 
evolution of the server industry (new business models, hardware/software 
bundling) suggested that inter-system competition could prove beneficial 
for long-run consumer welfare, without eliciting significant competitive 
concerns over the likely emergence and crystallization of dominant 
positions.  
3.2 TECHNOLOGICAL INTEGRATION AND THE MEDIA 
PLAYERS WAR: LIVE AND LET TIE? 
Together with the refusal to supply allegation, the Commission also 
addressed Microsoft’s decision to integrate its media player software with 
its client operating system, Windows, alleging that Microsoft illegally 
harmed competition and stifled technological innovation by tying the sale 
of the two products. According to the Commission, Microsoft devised its 
technological tying strategy in order to preserve its applications barrier to 
entry in the client OS market. 
Microsoft’s pricing strategy for Windows Media Player was also found to 
pose a serious risk of foreclosure. According to Microsoft’s competitors 
such as Real Networks, Microsoft was able to cross-subsidize its streaming 
media software in order to price below-cost and determine the exit of 
competitors from the market. As recently specified by Real Networks in its 
complaint to the US District Court, “Microsoft’s below-cost pricing ... poses 
                                                     
121 See Commission’s press release, 24 March 2004, available online at 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/382&format=HTML&aged=0&languag
e=EN&guiLanguage=en. (last visited: August 19, 2004). 
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a serious probability of creating a monopoly in the digital media markets ... 
Microsoft can recoup its losses by later charging supra-competitive prices 
for its digital media products, or by later charging supra-competitive prices 
for operating systems with digital media bundled in”.122  
In what follows we address the approach adopted by the Commission 
regarding technological leveraging, in order to assess whether such 
approach is based on sound economic analysis. We first describe the main 
features of the relevant market, and then move to assessing the economic 
impact of Microsoft’s peculiar integrated design on consumer welfare, 
competition and innovation.  
3.2.1 The relevant market 
In assessing Microsoft’s conduct in marketing its Windows Media Player, 
the Commission defined the relevant market quite narrowly, by excluding 
software programmes that allow users to play audiovisual content, but not 
to stream media files. The Commission distinguished between 
downloading and streaming audiovisual content; and concluded that 
software programmes that allow for streaming media constitute a separate 
relevant market. We agree with the market definition adopted by the 
Commission, since there seems to be negligible demand-side and supply-
side substitutability between media streaming software and media 
download software.  
In the relevant market defined by the Commission, the most powerful 
players are Microsoft’s Windows Media Player, Real Networks’ Real Player 
and Apple’s Quick Time. A number of other streaming media products 
hold a non-negligible market share – namely Nullsoft’s Winamp, Music 
Match, Media Jukebox, Ashampoo and VLC Mediaplayer.123 Yet, the 
Commission decided to exclude those media players from the relevant 
market, since they depend on third-parties’ proprietary technologies, and 
as such – in the Commission’s view – do not exert any competitive pressure 
on major players.124  
                                                     
122 See RealNetworks’ Complaint and demand for Jury Trial, December 18, 2003, available at 
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/news/local/links/real_complaint1218.pdf, §139 (last visited: August 19, 
2004). 
123 See Commission’s decision, supra note 2, at §§411 ff.  
124 “To the extent, therefore, that these media players depend on third parties’ proprietary 
technologies, such as Microsoft’s, for format support, they are not likely to constrain the third 
parties’ behaviour”. Id., at §413.  
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The Commission’s choice to exclude those other players from the relevant 
market is hardly understandable. In order to fully explain why such a 
perspective should not be endorsed, we need to get back to our discussion 
of system competition, as described in Section 2. Streaming media software 
is indeed part of a system, composed of three complementors.  
3.2.1.1 Media streaming software is a complementor 
Streaming involves breaking a file into small pieces or “packets” and 
sending them over a network. This process is controlled by specialized 
server software known as streaming media software. Before being 
streamed, content is digitized using formats known as “codecs”, which 
differ depending on the specific technology used, and is normally 
encrypted using DRM technologies, such as Windows Media Rights 
Manager, RealSystem Media Commerce Suite or Helix DRM. Methods to 
control that software packets are correctly transmitted and recomposed in 
the right order involve the use of protocols, which control also the way 
content is used on the streaming media device (for instance, how to send 
playback commands, pause commands etc.). Such protocols can be open (as 
is the case of IETF’s Real Time Streaming Protocol) or proprietary (e.g. 
Microsoft’s Media Server Protocol MMF). The protocols are executed by 
media streaming software installed on client PCs and running on client OS. 
In summary, media streaming software is a complementor in a wider 
system. Such system has three main complementors: a) the streaming 
media server software; b) the client streaming media software;  and c) the 
formats or codecs supported by those players. All three complementors 
must be compatible in order for one media streaming system to be used. 
Existing systems exhibit different architectures, which allow for inter-
system and intra-system competition. The three major players in the 
relevant market use incompatible formats – i.e., content that is digitized 
according to, say, Microsoft’s format cannot be read by Apple’s software. 
The other players compete in the streaming media market with major 
players, but rely on third-parties’ technologies for other complementors. In 
particular, software such as MusicMatch Jukebox, Winamp and Ashampoo 
support several formats, including Microsoft’s WMA format. Other 
products do not support Microsoft’s format, but support MPEG and DivX 
codecs.125  
                                                     
125 In particular, the Commission specifies that “MusicMatch Jukebox, for example, licenses and 
relies on the Windows Media codec and also supports MPEG formats. Winamp supports MP3, 
WAV and Microsoft’s WMA format (Winamp does not support RealNetworks. formats). The VLC 
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A careful observation of the streaming media market reveals that three 
alternative integrated systems compete on this market, while allowing for 
third-party reliance on their interface specifications. In other words, the 
market is characterized by both inter-system and intra-system competition. 
From this standpoint, there seems to be no particular reason for the 
Commission to exclude intra-system competitors from the relevant market.  
What will be the effect of this particular market environment on 
competitive dynamics? As we explained in Section 2, in case the sector is 
dominated by a closed system, in which all three complementors are 
proprietary and marketed by the same firm, there will be only space for 
inter-system competition. Alternatively, in case some (but not all) 
complementors are based on open technologies and are selectively 
disclosed to a limited number of operators, a degree of intra-system 
competition will be observed. Finally, if all three complementors are based 
on technologies fully disclosed to the public, competitors will be able to 
enter the market by perfectly emulating existing products.   
In other words, the type of system architecture chosen by industry players 
affects the type of competition that will be observed in the market, as well 
as the level of entry barriers for would-be entrants. In particular, Microsoft 
chose to market a semi-open streaming media system. In case its 
technology comes to dominate the market, new entrants would face a 
trade-off: either they enter the streaming media software market by relying 
on Microsoft’s technologies in other complementors (intra-system 
competition), or they will have to develop a fully integrated system and 
engage in inter-system competition, by trying to market a higher-quality 
product and conquer market shares with it.  
The welfare effects of an inter-system competitive environment vis-à-vis 
intra-system competition depend on the relative weight of direct and 
indirect network effects as well as learning effects. As we already explained 
in Section 2, if both network and learning effects are significant, there is a 
risk that the market will tip towards the emergence of a single standard 
technology, and that such technology will constantly enjoy a substantial 
competitive advantage over rival ones. This situation might end up stifling 
innovation, to the detriment of consumer welfare. At the other extreme, 
whenever neither network nor learning effects occur, inter-system 
competition is a viable competitive environment, just as happens in all 
                                                                                                                                       
Mediaplayer supports, for example, MPEG and DivX codecs. Ashampoo distributes the 
Ashampoo Media Player, which is based on Windows and plays ‘over twenty file formats’ 
(including Windows Media formats, MP3, and Ogg Vorbis).” Id., at §412. 
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traditional markets. For instance, we usually do not complain because 
engines installed on Mercedes cars are not fully interoperable with BMWs. 
And this happens because the availability of a large number of competing 
engines is normally not a driver of consumer demand in the choice of a car 
– i.e., cars are system goods but not a two-sided market.  
All other situations are hybrid – inter-system competition might prove 
preferable to intra-system competition absent significant network or 
learning effects, but intra-system competition might be more reassuring, 
form the standpoint of consumer welfare in the long run, if learning effects 
are not overwhelming. To be sure, the Commission expressed the concern 
that the ubiquity of Microsoft WMP on end users’ desktops will lead the 
market to tip towards Microsoft’s technology. Moreover, the Commission 
is worried that, once the market has tipped, Microsoft will start charging 
supracompetitive prices and gradually lower the quality of its product.126  
We question this approach in its two pillars. First, we doubt that the market 
is inevitably doomed to tipping, and doubt that tipping is a disdainful 
perspective for the streaming media software market. Secondly, Microsoft 
might be able to start charging excessive prices and lower the quality of its 
product only if it starts denying interface information to those competitors 
that as of now engage in system competition. But this will not be possible, 
since Microsoft already committed to disclose such information at RAND 
conditions under the consent decree signed with the US government.127  
3.2.1.2 Will the streaming media market tip? 
The Commission explained – and Real Networks stated also in the US – 
that the market for streaming media is characterized by strong network 
effects, and that – for such reason – sooner or later one technology will 
“tip” and will quickly become the one and only technology available to end 
users.128 However, there are many reasons that elicit some doubts on the 
likelihood that this market will tip, with harmful effects for end users.  
First, streaming media software, unlike downloads, do not exhibit direct 
network effects. End users will never share with other users the 
                                                     
126 In one of its Statements of Objection, the Commission even expressed the concern that 
Microsoft could gradually lower the quality of its product once the market has tipped, by 
enabling only low bitrates and preventing its media player from streaming CD-quality content. 
127 Note that streaming media software exposes APIs and is therefore classified as middleware. As 
such, it is covered by the provisions of the US Consent decree. See supra, Section 1.1. 
128 As stated by the Commission, “The network effects characterising the media software markets 
... translate into entry barriers for new entrants”. Commission’s decision, supra note 2, at §420. 
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audiovisual content they enjoy on their client PCs. Streaming media are a 
one-way network, not a two-way one, and entail narrowcasting content, 
not downloading and sharing.129 As a result, the virtual network of media 
streaming does not exhibit the virtuous features that economists tribute to 
two-way or e2e virtual networks, including the so-called Metcalfe’s law, 
according to which the value of a network grows exponentially as the 
number of its users grows linearly; and the outward shift in the demand 
curve we described in Figure 2 will not materialize in this market.130 
No doubt, the streaming media market might exhibit, to a certain extent, 
indirect network effects, stemming from the middleware nature of media 
player software. Media player producers know that they have to get two 
different categories of users “on board”. On the one hand, content 
producers will choose to digitize their audiovisual content in one player’s 
format as the ubiquity and popularity of such players grows. If a media 
player is not sufficiently widespread, content producers will not decide to 
associate their content with its format. After all, adapting the same content 
to different formats is costly, and this might spur the emergence of a single 
technology. But within this technology, all competing producers of 
streaming media software will profit from the success of the platform. To 
the extent that sufficient intra-system competition is preserved, there 
should be no particular source of concern for consumer welfare. The only 
negative effect related to this scenario is the loss of technological 
heterogeneity in the market. But the Commission does not seem 
particularly worried about this issue – to the contrary, it is imposing de 
facto technological standardization in the server OS industry.  
Finally, learning effects do not seem to be an issue in the market for 
streaming media software. Users know very well how to use the products, 
whose graphical user interface closely resembles old-style tape recorders. 
As a result, users that decide to switch to another media player would face 
no significant switching costs. The only problem is that –  if they switch to 
an entirely new technology – they might find less content available for the 
new media format. On the other hand, if users switch to an intra-system 
competitor, they will be able to stream the same content, but using a 
different software.  
In summary, the relevant market does not appear doomed to tipping, for 
the absence of both direct network effects and learning effects. Indirect 
                                                     
129 On the difference between unidirectional (one-way) and multidirectional (two-ways) 
networks, see Pardolesi and Renda, supra note 46, note 28 and accompanying text. 
130 On Metcalfe’s law, see supra note 46 and accompanying text.  
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network effects might, to a certain extent, raise a barrier to entry for new 
industry players, in case such players want to engage in inter-system 
competition. However, if sufficient intra-system competition is preserved 
in the market – as should be the case after Microsoft signed the US consent 
decree –, no particular competitive advantage would be enjoyed by WMP 
over competing players that use the same technology.  
3.2.2 Microsoft’s conduct in the relevant market, its 
underlying strategy and its effects 
In the Commission’s view, Microsoft tied the sale of Windows with that of 
its WMP for two main reasons. First, Microsoft aimed at monopolizing the 
media player market, which is a growing and increasingly strategic sector. 
Secondly, Microsoft illegally attempted to preserve its paramount position 
in the client OS market, by shielding its Windows OS from the competitive 
threat of emerging middleware such as media streaming software.  
As regards monopolization of the streaming media player market, such 
goal would be achieved only if Microsoft could eliminate all inter-system 
and intra-system competitors. According to the Commission, Microsoft 
could succeed in such an attempt, since it controlled the most attractive 
distribution channel for streaming media software, the OEM channel.131  
How could Microsoft achieve control over the OEM channel? The answer is 
simple, and closely recalls arguments fully explored during the US case. 
According to competition authorities on both sides of the Atlantic, 
Microsoft upholds technological integration of different products as a 
strategy aimed at achieving desktop ubiquity for its middleware products, 
hence protecting its paramount position in the client OS market. 
Accordingly, just as it did with its Internet Explorer, integrated into 
Windows 98, Microsoft commingled the source code of Windows Media 
Player with that of Windows 98 (Second Edition), starting on May, 1999. 
Microsoft then kept following this strategy for subsequent versions of 
Windows and WMP.132  
By endorsing a code-commingling strategy, Microsoft was allegedly able to 
force OEMs to purchase Windows – a de facto industry standard that 
inevitably drives end users’ demand – together with its added streaming 
                                                     
131 After stating that “tying Windows Media Player affords Microsoft unmatched ubiquity on 
client PCs worldwide” (§§843-848), the Commission specifies that neither installation agreements 
with OEMs (§§849-857), nor downloading (§§858-871) can offset such ubiquity. Also other 
available distribution channels are found to be second-best (§§872-876). 
132 See Commission’s decision, supra note 2, at §909. 
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media functionality. As a result, OEMs do not have the possibility to 
choose whether to pre-install Windows without WMP in their computers. 
End users will inevitably find WMP pre-installed on their PCs, and will 
have little or no incentive to switch to competing products. 
In our opinion, the Commission’s conclusion that Microsoft has illegally 
tied WMP with Windows 98 and subsequent versions lays on quite shaky 
foundations. As a matter of fact, as recalled by the Commission, an 
anticompetitive tying under Article 82 of the EC Treaty requires the 
following evidence: a) the tying and tied goods must be two separate 
products; b) the undertaking concerned is dominant in the tying product 
market; c) the undertaking concerned does not give customers a choice to 
obtain the tying product without the tied product; and d) the alleged tying 
forecloses competition.133 No doubt, Microsoft is dominant in the tying 
market and does not give customers a choice of obtaining the tying product 
without the tied product. And we can concede that streaming media 
software has sufficient stand-alone customer demand to be defined as a 
separate product from the Windows OS.134 But the foreclosure effect of 
Microsoft’s conduct on competition is very hard to detect and prove.  
In order to state that Microsoft could foreclose competition by 
commingling the code of Windows and WMP, the Commission should 
have provided reasonable evidence. In particular, we question that 
Microsoft could effectively rule competitors out of the relevant market just 
by controlling the OEM distribution channel. There are indeed many 
alternative channels available to competitors wishing to bring their 
streaming media software to market. The most common of these channels 
is certainly direct download from the Web.135 With modern, widespread 
high-speed Internet connections, streaming media software takes three 
minutes to download. And most users, as confirmed by the Commission, 
keep more than one streaming media product on their PCs, since these 
middleware products require only negligible space on the hard disk – more 
and more negligible as the cost of memory storage becomes lower and 
lower overtime.  
                                                     
133 Id., at §794. For an analysis of the US and EU competition authorities’ approach to tying, see 
Ahlborn, Evans and Padilla, The Antitrust Economics of Tying, supra note 12. 
134 See Larry Lessig’s proposed test for applying Jefferson Parish to tying cases in the software 
industry, in his Brief as Amicus Curiae in the US Microsoft case, February 1, 2000, available at 
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/amicus/us_v_microsoft_lessig.pdf. (last visited: August 19, 2004). 
135 Other distribution channels include bundling of streaming media software with other software 
or Internet access services and – less importantly – retail sales. See the Commission’s decision, 
supra note 2, at §§872-876.  
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Moreover, the parallelism between the browser integration and the media 
player integration should not lead to a full analogy between the two cases. 
Recall that, unlike Internet browsers, existing media players support 
different formats. The real driver of end users’ demand is then content, 
much more than ready-to-use integrated code. If users want to stream a 
particular audiovisual file, they will be asked whether they already 
installed the specific software needed for streaming that file. If this is not 
the case, users will be able to easily download the software from the Web 
and then the streaming will become possible; in fact, several millions of 
users ended up with more than one streaming media software after 
following these steps. Commercial agreements between producers of 
streaming media players and content producers are therefore a key driver 
for media players’ commercial success. And over the past few years, 
leading producers such as Real Networks have signed lots of these 
strategically crucial exclusive agreements with many important content 
producers – such as America On Line, Virgin Records, BMG, ABC, CBS and 
many others.136  
As a result, it is fairly difficult to imagine that Microsoft’s conduct could 
have the effect of determining competitors’ exit from the relevant market. 
Accordingly, we disagree with statements recently made by Microsoft’s 
fiercest competitor, Real Networks, that “[a]vailable methods of 
distribution are not a fully effective substitute for preinstallation by PC 
makers.”137  
One possible source of foreclosure put forward by Real Networks is the 
double cost OEMs would face in case they decide to pre-install more than 
one media player on their PCs, as well as the double cost end user would 
face in case they decide to install ex post a second media player. As far as 
the latter issue is concerned, we already pointed out that such additional 
cost is negligible in the case of media players, given the ease of download 
and automatic installation of these products. For what concerns additional 
support costs faced by OEMs that decide to pre-install a competing media 
player, the magnitude of the problem seems at best negligible if compared 
with the homologous issue raised for the browsers war in the US. As a 
                                                     
136 Many examples of important commercial agreements signed by RealNetworks are found 
directly on the firm’s pressroom at http://www.realnetworks.com/company/press/releases/.   
137 See RealNetworks US Complaint, supra note 123: “For example, offering software for 
downloading has difficulties and costs. Many customers who begin to download software give 
up before the download completes. ... of those people who succeed in downloading the entire file, 
many will never install the software. Furthermore, businesses often preclude employees from 
downloading and installing software”. Id., at §165. 
FOOL MONTI KILLS BILL? 
Draft – please do not cite 62
matter of fact, the majority of audiovisual content available on the Web is 
in Real Player format, and such a circumstance provides OEMs with more 
than sufficient incentives to decide to install Real Player. Furthermore, Real 
Player has exploited such a competitive advantage by negotiating contracts 
with major OEMs and with the leading motherboard producer, Intel, under 
which PCs will come bundled with RealPlayer software.138 More recently, 
Red Hat and SuSe announced that their respective Linux distributions will 
come bundled with RealNetworks’ Real Player and Helix Player. Such an 
agreement will soon lead to the marketing of a Real Player 10 for Linux.139 
Sure, Microsoft could try to achieve a competitive advantage by granting 
favourable license conditions to those OEMs that decide not to promote 
competing media players. But this problem has already been tackled by the 
US consent decree, as we explained in Section 1.1.  
Notwithstanding the patent difference between the browsers war and the 
media player war, the Commission stated that the OEM channel must be 
considered as an unrivalled means of distributing streaming media 
software, and that control over this distribution channel leads to 
foreclosure of competitors from the market. Alternative distribution 
systems, concluded the Commission, “do not enable media players 
competing with WMP to match the ubiquitous and guaranteed presence of 
the pre-installed WMP code on client PCs worldwide.”140  
3.2.2.1 Some law and economics of technological integration 
Even if Microsoft’s conduct is found to satisfy the four-step screen 
normally applied by the European Commission in order to detect 
anticompetitive tying, we must live with the fact that technological 
integration is quite different from standard tying.141 In other words, in most 
                                                     
138See Real Networks Snags Intel Distribution Deal, May 30, 2001, on News.com, at 
http://news.com.com/RealNetworks+snags+Intel+distribution+deal/2100-1023_3-264197.html (last 
visited: August 19, 2004). 
139 See, e.g., Phil Hochmuth, Real wants to be 'the' media player for Linux, Network World Linux 
Newsletter, 07/07/04, at http://www.nwfusion.com/newsletters/linux/2004/0705linux2.html. (last 
visited: August 19, 2004). 
140 See Commission’s decision, supra note 2, at §877. 
141 As is widely known, economists from the Chicago School rejected the idea that tying could 
facilitate the leveraging of a firm’s monopoly position in the tying market, allowing it to 
profitably monopolize the tied market. The so-called post-Chicago economics, however, 
challenged this “single monopoly profit” theorem, showing that the unprofitability of monopoly 
leveraging holds only under rather restrictive conditions. (In particular, Professor Michael 
Whinston produced a model showing that the Chicago School critique of leveraging theory only 
applies when the tied market is perfectly competitive. In his model, tying commits the monopolist 
to being more aggressive than the entrant, and this commitment discourages entry. Professor 
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cases technological integration was found to create more appealing and 
efficient products, therefore enhancing consumer welfare. For such reason, 
US courts have gradually abandoned the per se rule approach normally 
adopted for tying claims, and upheld a more careful rule of reason 
approach, aimed at ascertaining whether the integrated product is more 
valuable to end users than the sum of its parts.142  
The rule of reason approach adopted by the Court of Appeals in Microsoft 
III is the result of a long debate in the US law and economics literature. US 
courts have realized the importance of technological defences to 
technological tying allegations since IBM v. Telex Co., and have developed a 
significant degree of deference with respect to peculiar choices of 
technological design that determine the integration of two 
complementors.143 In Innovation Data Processing v. IBM, the court found that 
IBM had not violated antitrust rules since, “rather than constituting an 
illegal tying arrangement, [the integration] instead constitute[d] ... a lawful 
package of technologically interrelated components.”144 As we already 
recalled, the Consent decree signed by Microsoft and the DoJ in 1994 
already left Microsoft with the freedom to design its OS with add-on 
functionalities, and the D.C. Circuit in Microsoft I concluded that, “when ... 
                                                                                                                                       
Whinston shows that tying could be used to deter entry into, and thereby monopolize, the tied 
product market if (1) the selling firm is a monopolist in the tying product market, (2) the tied 
product market has decreasing average costs over the relevant range of output, and (3) the tied 
and tying products are used in variable proportions. Whinston finds, however, that the predicted 
welfare effects of even that specialized case of tying are ambiguous. See Ahlborn, Evans and 
Padilla, supra note 12; and J. Gregory Sidak, An Antitrust Rule for Software Integration, available at 
www.criterioneconomics.com/docs/SidakSoftwareArticle.pdf). During the US Microsoft case, even 
authoritative advocates of free software recognized that software integration can in most cases 
prove beneficial for end users. And a careful application of sound economic theory supports the 
“narrow and deferential approach” adopted by US Courts in dealing with technological 
integration. See infra, note 144.  
142 See Ahlborn, Evans and Padilla, supra note 12. 
143 See Telex Corp. v. IBM, 367 F. Supp. 258, 342 (N.D. Okla. 1973) (holding that if the new product 
was technologically superior than the original product, then it is beyond the scope of antitrust 
laws); see also Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307, 1330 (5th Cir. 1976) 
(noting that if a product is designed based on technological superiority, and not for 
anticompetitive purposes, then it would pass muster under antitrust laws); In re Data Gen. Corp. 
Antitrust Litig., 490 F. Supp. 1089, 1109 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (ruling that any design that is cheaper for 
the consumer may evade liability under antitrust laws); Foremost Pro Color v. Eastman Kodak Co., 
703 F.2d 534, 542 (9th Cir. 1983) (rejecting a rule of finding a per se tying arrangement on the basis 
of design alone); Innovation Data Processing v. IBM, 585 F. Supp. 1470, 1476 (D.N.J. 1984) (holding 
that technological reasons for integration were lawful under antitrust laws); and even Microsoft I, 
147 F.3d 935, 949-50 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“A court’s evaluation of a claim of integration must be 
narrow and deferential.”).  
144 See Innovation Data Processing v. IBM, 585 F. Supp. 1470, 1471-73 (D.N.J. 1984), at 1476.  
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combined”, Windows and IE constituted a single product.145 The D.C. 
Circuit in this case essentially created “a rule of per se legality for products 
characterized as integrated”146, pointing to products that combine 
“functionalities (which may also be marketed separately and operated 
together) in a way that offers advantages unavailable if the functionalities 
are bought separately and combined by the purchaser.”147 This means that 
the courts will have to carry out a two-pronged test: (1) the combination 
“must be different from what the purchaser could create from the separate 
products on his own,” and (2) the combined form must “be better in some 
respect.”148  
Now, is the combination of Windows and WMP an integrated product 
under this approach? The answer depends on whether the combination of 
the two products is worth to end-users more than the sum of its two parts. 
No doubt, software vendors can assemble the OS and the media player 
more efficiently than the average end user. But also OEMs can perform 
such task efficiently. The crucial question is then whether software vendors 
can integrate products more efficiently than OEMs. In order to answer this 
question, we need to explore the possible efficiencies stemming from code 
commingling. As far as the Windows-IE combination is concerned, the 
possibility of using the desktop as a Web page through Active Desktop and 
the rationalization of disk space through Windows Installer were two 
examples of added functionalities that could be achieved only through 
code-commingling. In the case at hand, the virtues of integration might be 
less evident. However, the problem is that the Commission did not even 
address the issue of potential efficiencies arising from technological 
integration of the operating system and a streaming media player. In case it 
turned out that consumers could derive a higher utility from having the 
software vendor assemble the two products (instead of leaving this task to 
OEMs or having to cope with it by themselves), the Commission would 
have to take into account such potential efficiency and balance it with other 
sources of inefficiency related to potential (and, to tell the truth, hardly 
detectable) foreclosure effects. 
In other words, the Commission has never directly addressed the problem 
of consumer harm in assessing the competitive impact of Microsoft’s 
                                                     
145 See Microsoft I, 980 F. Supp. 537, 540-41 (D.D.C. 1997), rev’d, 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998), at 544. 
146 See, e.g., John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Antitrust On Internet Time: Microsoft and the Law 
and Economics of Exclusion, 7 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 157, 198 (1999). 
147 See Microsoft I, supra note 146, at §948. 
148 Id., at 949. 
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conduct in the streaming media market. Authoritative commentators have 
recently denounced an increasing attitude towards neglecting the issue of 
consumer harm in antitrust policy, and considered the weaker, 
“edentulous” consumer harm standard adopted in cases like Intel, Microsoft 
or Visa to represent “economically unsound policy”.149 Such attitude 
dangerously brings the Commission back to the resounding j’accuse moved 
by US commentators and policy enforcers in the aftermath of the 
GE/Honeywell decision: that the Commission ends up “protecting 
competitors, not competition”.150  
Economists have also clearly pointed out that technological integration 
should be treated differently from traditional tying allegations by 
competition authorities. Under the Chicago school approach, economists 
have gradually acknowledged that tying can exert in most cases a 
beneficial impact on consumers. First, a technological tie-in can lead to 
beneficial removal of the deadweight loss, by allowing better price-
discrimination. Secondly, tying can reduce consumer risk. Thirdly, tying 
can in most cases respond to a need to control the quality of a system good. 
And, whereas traditional tie-ins can be seen as anticompetitive when they 
impose additional costs on consumers, software integration normally does 
not impose any additional charge on end users, since the tied product is in 
most cases priced at zero, i.e. in line with the marginal cost of most 
software products. This was the case for Microsoft’s tie-in of Internet 
Explorer with Windows, and is the case for Microsoft’s decision to integrate 
Windows with WMP.   
In summary, US enforcers, lawyers and economists have gradually reached 
the conclusion that technological tying deserves a more relaxed approach 
when subject to antitrust scrutiny, and certainly should be freed from the 
per se rule. The European Commission seems to have completely neglected 
the premises and underpinnings of such a twenty-year-long debate. Had 
the Commission applied sound economic theory, we doubt that 
unbundling of the media player would have reaped such a wide consensus 
in Brussels.   
                                                     
149 See Howard H. Chang, David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee, Has the Consumer Standard 
Lost its Teeth?, in Robert Hahn (Ed.), High-Stakes Antitrust.The Last Hurrah?, AEI-Brookings Joint 
Center for Regulatory Studies, 2003, 72-116.  
150 See, e.g. A. Jorge Padilla and Andrea Renda, Conglomerate Mergers, Consumer Goods and the 
‘Efficiency Offense’ Doctrine, available online at www.law-economics.net.  
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3.2.2.2 The effects of Microsoft’s conduct on rival players 
The alleged harmful effects suffered by Microsoft’s rivals consist in a likely 
foreclosure from the relevant market, once the market has tipped towards a 
single (Microsoft) de facto standard. According to Real Networks, 
Microsoft’s technological tying strategy leads to a number of undesirable 
effects: in the US, Real Networks has recently stated that Microsoft 
precluded OEMs from undertaking a number of initiatives, such as: a) 
changing the status and configuration of WMP, b) promoting rival players’ 
subscription services during the first run of a new PC, c) preloading music 
files encoded in alternative formats in the “My Music” Windows folder 
(where Microsoft preloads Windows Media Files), d) making any player 
other than the Windows Media Player the default player for many video 
and audio formats “preassigned” to WMP; e) honoring contractual 
promises to promote rivals’ subscription services during the introductory 
boot-up; f) giving rival players an agreed upon placement in the Start 
Menu of the PC; g) configuring PCs to run a rival utility to protect the 
consumer’s choice of default digital media player; h) preinstalling 
applications as “Start-up” applications; i) placing rival icons in the System 
Tray of their computers; j) including a hyperlink to allow users to register 
for rival players’ subscription during the initial registration sequence; k) 
placing other media players in the Most Recently Used menu; and l) 
providing a desktop icon for rival media players.151 
We do not question that such effects actually materialized in the relevant 
market. However, it seems quite clear that the real source of such a 
foreclosure effect is not Microsoft’s technological integration of the OS and 
the streaming media player, but Microsoft’s contractual behaviour. And if 
one carefully looks at the prescription contained in the consent decree 
signed by Microsoft and the DoJ and entered by District Judge Kollar-
Kotelly in November 2002, it becomes crystal clear that Microsoft’s 
commitments under such decree are sufficient to eliminate all these 
problems. Once OEMs will enjoy the freedom to promote rival players and 
change the boot-up procedure, no such foreclosure effect will arise.  
Furthermore, note that our discussion of foreclosure effects does not 
change if one takes into account the likelihood that the market will tip. 
Even if the market ends up tipping towards a single de facto standard 
technology, end users will profit from standardization and from intra-
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system competition, which allegedly will prevent Microsoft from charging 
supracompetitive prices and fall into irreversible x-inefficiency.   
3.2.3 Approaching the Pareto-pessimum 
The European Commission’s allegation that Microsoft harmed competition 
and stifled innovation by monopolizing the streaming media player market 
through technological tying is not supported by sound economic theory. 
The Commission did not have the chance to deal with technological 
integration in previous cases, and showed all its impasse in dealing with the 
peculiar dynamics of system competition under (indirect) network effects.  
Our discussion of the case at hand suggests that a ready solution was 
already available to European trustbusters – the US consent decree allows 
for easy intra-system competition without forcing Microsoft to remove an 
otherwise beneficial integrated design. Under the US solution, OEMs 
would be able to market competing players “on top of” Microsoft’s 
Windows/WMP bundle. What is most worrying is that the Commission 
has lost sight of consumer harm, has not satisfactorily proven foreclosure 
effects, and has treated technological integration exactly as an old-
fashioned tying claim. 
The solution devised by the European Commission, in synthesis, will 
produce harmful effects in many respects. First, Microsoft will be harmed, 
since it will have to invest new resources in unbundling its OS and media 
player. Secondly, all industry operators might be harmed by the 
Commission’s approach, since the choice of a semi-open architecture for 
system goods will become hardly workable. Thirdly, end users will lose the 
benefits of software integration. In other words, all industry players will be 
probably worse-off once such a solution is endorsed, but for the short-run 
benefit of the plaintiffs. And this situation closely resembles that of a 
“Pareto-pessimum”.  
CONCLUSION: WHO PROTECTS COMPETITION FROM 
COMPETITION POLICY? 
Competition policy, as we normally observe it, is all about using proxies. 
Economists acknowledge it quite easily. Since reality is often too complex 
for a policymaker to take into account all relevant variables, economic 
theory normally looks with favor at intermediate goals that allegedly steer 
the market economy towards welfare-enhancing equilibria. In the case of 
competition policy, a sufficiently competitive market environment is 
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normally considered as a proxy for the maximization of consumer welfare. 
And consumer welfare is normally held as an approximation of social 
welfare. A high market share is normally considered as a proxy for 
dominance, as well as pricing over marginal costs is normally termed 
“supracompetitive” and deemed as welfare-decreasing.  
So far, so good. But as far as proxies are concerned, competition policy 
enforcers diverge on whether the actual existence of a sufficient number of 
competitors should be deemed as a valuable proxy for the maximization of 
consumer and (consequently) social welfare. The EU authorities seem to 
hinge more often on such a “structuralist” approach to competition policy, 
if compared to the US enforcers. And this view – which, according to many 
commentators, is inherited from the Ordoliberal school that inspired the 
economic spirit of the EC Treaty – is often criticized by the US enforcers, 
especially as far as merger control is concerned, but also in dominance 
cases.152  
The divergence between the US and EU approaches to competition policy 
becomes even more evident if we consider that some of the proxies 
typically used by competition authorities in the application of competition 
law do not necessarily perform well in some industries. A telling example 
is provided by the complex world of high-tech, knowledge-based 
industries, which commentators normally define as “new economy”, 
“information economy” or “digital capitalism”. In these contexts, the 
market mechanism seldom plays the role of optimal resource allocator, the 
price level conveys scanty information to consumers, marginal costs and 
quantity restrictions simply do not exist, market shares normally make 
little or no sense, and a constant overlapping of one-generation 
monopolists is often preferable to mere competition in the market. As is 
understandable, competition authorities, in such dynamic environments, 
often lose orientation.   
An important consequence of such an impasse was the fall – though 
paradoxically dressed, in ex post public statements, as intransigent defense - 
of the consumer harm standard as one of the pillars of competition 
authorities’ rationale when sanctioning allegedly anticompetitive 
conducts.153 In the past few years, competition authorities on both sides of 
the Atlantic have started attaching higher value to the so-called harm to the 
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“competitive process” as a new proxy for harm to consumers. In many 
cases – most notably, Intel, Visa and Microsoft – such view has led to 
decisions that appeared at times “eccentric” if analyzed under the litmus 
test of economic theory.154  
In the EU, the stronger emphasis on market structure has led to a gradual 
overlapping of harm to competition with harm to competitors, with 
inevitably disastrous consequences. Such a decline of the structuralist 
approach explains why, in dealing with dynamic knowledge-based 
industries, the EU competition authorities have exhibited a more worrying 
lack of confidence than their homologous on the other side of the Atlantic.  
Accordingly, the Microsoft case, once more, deserves attention also for 
reasons other than the mere settlement of the opposing interests at stake. 
Our analysis has shown that the Commission followed a rather 
unconvincing path in dealing with Microsoft’s alleged “wielding of 
monopolistic leverage” – an issue known to modern antitrust enforcers 
since Times-Picayune, Xerox and Kodak, but that in the workgroup server OS 
market exhibits brand new features – and ended up building an impressive 
mountain of allegations, which only gave birth to a mouse. Moreover, the 
Commission adopted an outdated approach to software integration, 
leaving media player vendors with a hardly acceptable solution.  
Of course, this is not the end of the story. The Court of Justice will certainly 
scrutinize with zeal the allegations put forward by the Commission in the 
final decision. And the coming years will hopefully mark a stronger 
emphasis on economically sound antitrust rationales. Yet, one conclusion 
can already be drawn. Those who considered the traditional 
instrumentarium of competition policy to be adequately equipped for 
coping with the new challenges posed by the Internet age should probably 
acknowledge that competition authorities are in desperate urge for new 
economic tools. Only economically sound competition policy can protect 
dynamic competition from the unpredictable underpinnings of competition 
policymaking.155 And this is yet another reason for considering the 
Microsoft saga as an all-time milestone for the many fallacies of European 
trustbusters.  
 
                                                     
154 See Chang, Evans and Schmalensee, Has the Consumer Harm Standard Lost its Teeth?, supra note 
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155 “Mistaken inferences and the resulting false condemnations are especially costly, because they 
chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.” Verizon v. Trinko, supra note 109, 
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